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Preface  
In March 2012, 20 years after Norway acknowledged Ukrainian inde-
pendence, the Ukrainian Embassy in Oslo and the Norwegian Institute 
of Foreign Affairs (NUPI) co-hosted an event at NUPI to celebrate the 
date. Vice-ministers of Foreign Affairs Torgeir Larsen and Pavel 
Klimkin reminded us that our two countries had come a long way in 
developing bilateral relations in trade, politics and civil society con-
tacts. All former Norwegian ambassadors to Ukraine and two former 
ambassadors of Ukraine to Oslo recalled a range of episodes and ex-
periences to confirm the message. 
 
That same afternoon I sat down with Associate Professor Geir Flikke 
and NUPI colleagues to draft a concept for a follow-up in Kiev for the 
autumn of 2012. The intention was to continue where the Oslo event 
left off: that is, to bring the exchange of opinions from the descriptive 
and declaratory stage to a more analytical level, where scholars and 
observers could reflect on 20 years of relations between our two coun-
tries.  
 
As we drafted the agenda it soon became clear that it would make lit-
tle sense for the organizers or the contributors to view Norwegian–
Ukrainian relations in isolation. Ukraine was and is, as this volume is 
being prepared, in the process of signing an association and free trade 
agreement with the European Union. This arrangement will be deeper 
and more comprehensive than any similar agreements previously of-
fered by the EU to its partners, the exception being the EEA agree-
ment signed with Norway in 1992. Should an agreement be signed at 
the Vilnius Summit of EU’s Eastern Partnership in November 2013, 
Norway will have considerable experience to offer Ukraine in the 
complex process of integrating with the EU as a non-member. A new 
chapter might begin. 
 
It became clear that in order to make the autumn 2012 event relevant 
to the current situation, our two countries’ common interests in Eu-
rope would have to be at centre of attention. Hence the title of the 
seminar: Ukraine in Europe – Europe in Ukraine: 20 years of Ukrain-
ian – Norwegian relations. 
  
Of course, ‘Europe’ is a broader concept than just the EU and the in-
teraction of non-members with this political entity. Of no less im-
portance for Norway and Ukraine as European countries should be the 
principles to which we are committed in the Council of Europe, and 
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our efforts in the OSCE to promote a Europe not divided by political, 
human or cultural barriers. 
 
In the summer of 2012 NUPI’s plans were further assisted by the Kiev 
National Shevchenko University, which kindly offered to host and or-
ganize the event – and did so to perfection. The seminar, held on 25 
September, attracted more than 100 participants. 
 
This volume presents the main contributions to the first part of the 
seminar. In the second half, the focus was on more practical interven-
tions on economic relations and perspectives for development. That 
part of the event could merit a separate volume, but falls outside the 
scope of commitments taken on by NUPI. And here, as so often, one 
might wish that the Q & A sessions as well as the comments from the 
audience might be heard by a wider public, as they gave us all food 
for thought. 
 
The Embassy would like again to thank NUPI and the Kiev National 
Shevchenko University, as well as Professors Geir Flikke and Vo-
lodymir Zaslavskyi, for their invaluable contributions to the event and 
the subsequent publication of the present volume. 
 
Jon Fredriksen, Ambassador of Norway to Ukraine 
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Is there a common EU policy on Ukraine? The question might seem 
unnecessary, considering the role that the EU has played in engaging 
Ukraine ever since 2004. The adoption of a European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the regular bi-annual 
summits between the EU troika and the Ukrainian government – these 
add up to more than simply a rudimentary or improvised ad hoc ap-
proach to Ukrainian affairs. The EU has indeed engaged with Ukraine 
on a comprehensive scale. The tools and policies have been consistent, 
based on incentives and conditionality, and in line with the EU’s 
neighbourhood criteria: to enhance security for the wider Europe by 
improving governance and assisting neighbouring countries in their 
often turbulent transformation from post-Communism.  
 
The question might also seem irrelevant in view of the growing 
recognition of the problems that Ukraine faces. Ukraine was hard hit 
by the economic crisis in Europe, and its economy is recovering only 
slowly. This setback did not reduce the political awareness of devel-
opments in Ukraine, however: it made the EU more forward-leaning 
in its policies throughout 2010/2011. It seems that EU officials were 
clearly indicating that concluding the agreements with the EU and 
complying with the EU’s normative demands would be beneficial for 
Ukraine, and might help to improve its dire economic conditions. 
 
As of 2012, there were no easy fixes: The relationship between 
Ukraine and the EU had never been as political as in that year. In the 
lead-up to the European Championship in Soccer, several leaders of 
EU countries decided not to attend the Yalta conference on regional 
security, and EU officials, such as Stefan Füle, were clear in their 
warnings to Ukraine not to reverse the standards of democratic rule 
developed since 2004. An entourage of European politicians contin-
ued their engagement in August/September, urging Ukraine’s leader-
ship to hold free and fair elections in October. In sum, then, politics 
has featured heavily in the relationship, and the EU has repeatedly told 
Ukrainian leaders what to do in order not to disqualify for attaining 
the Association Agreement (AA).  
                                                 
1  This chapter was written after the anniversary conference.  
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Today we must recognize that in 2011/2012, politics had to some ex-
tent overshadowed policies, if by ‘policies’ we mean concrete suc-
cesses and results. This is also where the problem of common enters 
in. Ukraine’s importance is recognized, not least by its neighbours, 
who have no desire to see years of hard work jeopardized. While it 
cannot be denied that Ukraine has not yet shown sufficient readiness 
to comply with EU standards and expectations in the areas of societal 
freedom, human rights and democratic governance, there is still a con-
cern that the EU – in the current economic crisis – may not be able to 
formulate a concise policy that outlines expectations and rewards for 
Ukraine if it desires closer approximation with the EU. As mentioned 
by James Sherr in this volume, the EU should not be blindfolded by a 
‘now or never’ deadline in November 2013, but needs to think beyond 
also this benchmark. Moreover, as Olaf Osica holds, Ukraine is more 
than a question of politics: it is a neighbour and a people. 
 
While numerous dilemmas surfaced in 2012, the year culminated in a 
specific sequencing of events that has reinforced EU policies and in-
duced clarity into it. On the one hand, the current government in 
Ukraine has only partially heeded the EU’s consistent and repeated 
warnings about violating the rights of the Ukrainian opposition, as 
seen in the protracted and still pending release of its major front-figure 
opposition politicians. On the other hand, the EU has presented clear 
incentives through an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Indeed, the diffuse 
policies of Ukraine have engendered further clarity from the EU: there 
will be no rewards or special relationship if the standards of such a 
privileged position are not adhered to.  
 
This implies, however, that there is an EU policy on Ukraine – with a 
clear normative dimension, and unmistakable consequences for 
Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine faces a problem of ‘Europeanization’, with 
Europeanization implying that the state has the capacity both to exer-
cise sovereignty and pool it in discrete areas. As mentioned by Alex-
ander Duleba in this volume, this is exactly what the EU offers. EU 
membership or association does not mean ‘an end to sovereign nations 
in Europe; rather, it means a new “integrative reading” of sovereignty 
that is shared by the states participating in the European project’ (p. 
30). To embrace this ‘sovereignty’ stands out as a major problem in 
Ukraine’s current juggling of alternative integration projects, as well 
as in the deeply complex and entangled domestic policy dimension. 
And it also constitutes a major problem for the EU; EU approximation 
should not only help promote Europeanization – it should also be an 
incentive for it, and this is where the relationship currently falls short. 
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Three Reflections and an Occasion 
In this volume, we do not seek to answer the questions above, at least 
not in any yes/no way. There are ambiguities, and these may in a 
sense be seen as a part of an on-going process of defining and redefin-
ing the EU’s external–internal policy dimensions. What this volume 
seeks to do is to take stock of the relationship as seen from one partic-
ular angle, and as perceived in a specific context. It came about as a 
panel in a conference dedicated to the anniversary of 20 years of 
Ukrainian–Norwegian relations, and also of the year when the Porto 
Agreement was signed (1992), regulating Norwegian–EU relations. 
This may seem an accidental conflation of coincidences, but also co-
incidences can offer background for reflections. I will suggest three. 
 
Reflection number one: Norway’s position with regard to the EU’s 
policies is not given. This may offer some measure of flexibility in the 
formulation of policies. On the one hand, as both an insider and an 
outsider to the European Union, Norway has a specific set of foreign 
policy tools, as well as a set of experiences that may prove useful for 
countries seeking approximation to EU standards, and also useful as a 
pathway towards free trade with the EU. Norway and the EFTA coun-
tries are not part of the EU’s Customs Union, and the EFTA Free 
Trade Agreements are instruments regulated primarily by WTO.2 This 
means that WTO members like Ukraine can enter into EFTA Free 
Trade Agreements, as Ukraine did in 2011. On the other hand, the 
EEA agreement was born out of a particular context, and may also, as 
underlined in a recent official Norwegian report (NOU) on Norway’s 
relationship to the EU, be seen as a unique arrangement not directly 
replicable for other countries. As that report notes, Norway was the 
only country that in the early 1990s saw the EEA agreement as a sec-
ond path and a viable alternative to EU membership.3 Indeed, there is 
nothing in the EFTA Free Trade Agreement as such to indicate it is a 
waiting room for further approximation with the EU, nor that it is in-
tended as a reward for deep-reaching ‘Europeanization’ on the part of 
those countries that attain it. In essence, it does not impose normative 
predicaments onto states that enter into it, and it offers substantial in-
centives for trade. Still, state governance and economic performance 
are essential for creating a framework of trust, which is attractive for 
trading partners in Norway.   
 
                                                 
2  ‘Inside or Outside? Norway’s Agreements with the EU’, NOU no. 2, 2012 p. 749, hence-
forth: NOU, 2012. As noted in this NOU, the evolution of the EFTA Free Trade Agree-
ments is evident in the fact that while trade agreements with third parties normally ‘mir-
rored’ EU Free Trade Agreements and followed the EU, in the last few years, EFTA Free 
Trade Agreements have been more of a separate tool for Norway. Major reasons are that 
these agreements are quick to negotiate, and that WTO negotiations have been stalling, 
thus making bilateral trade arrangements more of a priority for countries.  
3   NOU, 2012. 
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Reflection number two: Norway plays a specific role in wider Europe 
through its EEA Grant Mechanism. Today, the EU is still caught in a 
severe economic crisis, so the anniversary conference could perhaps 
not have come at a worse time. There is, as observed by Olaf Osica in 
this volume, a fatigue and disillusionment also among ‘new’ EU 
members that actively promote closer ties between the EU and Ukra-
ine. Although former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Jonas 
Gahr Støre, adopted as his slogan to ‘make a difference’,4 Norway 
could perhaps make only small difference in this situation, as the rela-
tionship is first and foremost between Ukraine and the European Un-
ion. However, as he also remarked in an article in the quality daily Af-
tenposten (2011), Norway’s neighbourhood extends widely, and in-
cludes the neighbourhood of the ‘new’ member states of the EU.5 In 
terms of geography, this may seem hard to comprehend, but it should 
be recalled that Norway, through the EEA Grant Mechanism, donates 
funding to new EU members, explicitly for use in trans-border coop-
eration with EU neighbouring states. Slovakia alone received NOK 
650 million for the next period. For the period 2009–2014, the EEA 
and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism distribute around EUR 1.8 
billion for such projects, aimed at promoting social equality and effec-
tive cross-border cooperation between members of the EU and the EU 
neighbourhood.6  
 
Reflection number three: Norway has unique experience as an insider-
outsider that may be useful for countries that are not eligible for mem-
bership. Norway’s relationship with the EU is regulated mainly by the 
EEA agreement signed in Porto on 2 May 1992. This agreement has 
been both unique and evolutionary: unique in the sense that no other 
EFTA country chose the path of an EEA agreement with the EU and 
additional bilateral arrangements; evolutionary as it has become grad-
ually more encompassing. At the start, the agreement consisted of a 
total of 1849 legal acts; in 2010 the total number of legal acts covered 
by the agreement reached 8311.7 As the NOU on Norway’s relation-
ship to the EU concluded: ‘there has been a significant Europeaniza-
tion of Norway in the last twenty years’. In all, Norway has adopted 
about ¾ of all EU legislation, without becoming a member of the EU.8 
There is no doubt that the EEA agreement and the mechanisms for 
implementing EU regulations have solid and lasting effects on domes-
tic policies and regulations in Norway.9 Indeed, this means that the 
                                                 
4  This is the title of the Minister’s autobiography and travel notes published in 2010. 
5  Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘Vårt nye nærområde’, Aftenposten, 13 February, 2011. 
6  NOU, 2012, p. 761.  
7  Ibid. p. 107.  
8  Ibid., p. 18.  
9  Formally, Norway has a veto right over directives from the EU, and all EU legislative acts 
must be voted on by the Norwegian parliament. In the period 1992–2011, the Storting 
(Parliament) voted on 287 EU acts, and 265 of these were unanimously adopted. Thus, the 
policies of Europeanization have not produced political polarization. Of a total of 6000 
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EEA Agreement is a mechanism for Europeanization, a process ur-
gently needed in Ukraine today. 
 
What do these reflections imply for the bilateral relationship? To the 
extent that this volume was occasioned by a celebration of an anniver-
sary, what we celebrated then is still in its beginning. As yet, relations 
between Ukraine and Norway are limited to certain specific areas of 
cooperation; and exports and imports are low after the 2008 economic 
crisis. In 2010, Ukraine exported chemical products, animal fodder 
and agricultural products for NOK 711 million (down 33 per cent 
from 2009) to Norway, and Norway exported products (mostly fish-
ery) to the Ukrainian market for NOK 1.2 billion (down 11 per cent 
from 2009).10 As the EFTA free trade agreement entered into force in 
2012, the potential for trade between Norway and Ukraine is still un-
der-utilized. State visits have been irregular, with Norway’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Gahr Støre visiting Ukraine the last time in 2006, 
and Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hryshchenko in 2004. In 
2011, however, Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov visited Oslo, and held 
a speech at the Norwegian–Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce. While 
Norway’s perceptions of Ukraine do not seem to diverge funda-
mentally from those expressed by the EU, there is a desire to enhance 
the room for free trade, and there is a concern about political develop-
ments inside Ukraine. But there is also recognition of an under-used 
potential, one that could be put to better use. Can this be done? 
 
In this volume, panel participants were invited to share their ideas on 
Ukraine’s place in Europe, but also the relationship between the EU 
and Ukraine. As such, this volume mirrors a larger political context, 
but also a sequence of engagements undertaken partly by the Embassy 
of Ukraine in Oslo, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kiev, and the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in the course of 
2012. As noted, the formal occasion for this sequence was the fact that 
in that year, Ukrainian–Norwegian relations celebrated their 20th anni-
versary, as the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kiev had opened in 
1992. Moreover, in 2012 Norway was also celebrating the 20th anni-
versary of the Porto Agreement (2 May 1992) and the creation of the 
EEA agreement with the EU. Against this backdrop, there emerged 
the idea of a bilateral arrangement on the larger context of EU–
Ukraine relations. To this end, a seminar was held in Kiev on 25 Sep-
tember 2012 – the same date as the opening of the Royal Norwegian 
Embassy in Kiev twenty years earlier. Predating this was a similar 
                                                 
legislative acts adopted through the EEA agreement, there was discussion of using the ve-
to right in only 17. 
10  Statistics from the Norwegian MFA, available at: 
http://www.landsider.no/land/ukraina/fakta/bilaterale/  
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seminar held in Oslo at NUPI in March 2012, thanks to an initiative 
from the Ukrainian Embassy in Oslo.11 
 
Anniversaries certainly matter as milestones in a bilateral relationship, 
and perhaps also as occasions when timing and context are brought to 
bear simultaneously. By the sometimes successful approximation of 
diplomacy, anniversaries can be understood as a backdrop for formu-
lating policies, or taking stock of relations. We do so in this volume, 
aware that stocktaking involves more than mere reiteration of diplo-
matic relations: seminars need to address the issues, and move beyond 
the simple matter of ‘concepts’ that may create impressions about sim-
ilarity and policy convergence. That forms the deeper context for this 
volume. The anniversary conference took stock of relations by draw-
ing on contributions from recognized experts. Below, a brief outline of 
the major arguments of the participants is given.  
Panel Participants and Contributions 
According to James Sherr (Chatham House, UK), Ukrainian officials 
define Ukraine as a European state, and one facing a European choice. 
Indeed, Ukraine is both European and Slavic, and any attempt to sug-
gest that these are antagonistic does not make sense. But there is a 
sense of an impasse, Sherr continues. First, Ukraine is a part of the 
EFTA network, but this is not a pathway to EU membership, he holds. 
Outlining the differences between the EFTA and the EU (intergovern-
mental organization versus political union), Sherr notes that the EU 
has a higher standard for its policy of association, but also that the 
EFTA’s free trade agreement with Ukraine is not an instance of ‘dou-
ble standards’. Indeed, the EFTA free trade agreements are more ‘lax’ 
in their provisions, and also used as a tool to promote global trade, but 
this does not imply that the agreement is void of any normative condi-
tionality. Second, Sherr suggests that the relationship between the EU 
and Ukraine has been deteriorating throughout 2011/2012. There are 
three main sources for this impasse: Ukraine’s civic and political in-
heritance, a post-Soviet economic culture, and obstacles placed on 
Ukraine’s way to Europe by Ukraine’s own government. As Sherr 
contends, these factors have contributed to state-building in Ukraine, 
at least in the first phase of Ukrainian independence. However, they 
fail utterly as vehicles for securing approximation with EU standards.  
 
Can the current impasse be surmounted? Sherr offers no easy fix here. 
He stresses the need to stop the ‘integration by declaration’ policy, 
and start to address the proposals and demands of the EU. Moreover, 
he clearly dismisses the view that the EU has not made serious efforts 
                                                 
11  For the speech of the Norwegian State Secretary (vice-minister) from this seminar, see: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/taler_og_artikler_av_ovrig_pol
itisk_lede/taler_torgeir_larsen/2012/ukraine_norway.html?id=674979  
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at making the relationship work. Indeed, as he notes, ‘negotiations [on 
the Association Agreement] have been reinforced by an intensity of 
diplomatic activity and high-level engagements that should cast no 
doubt on the EU’s seriousness’ (p. 26). Moreover, only tangible pro-
gress in this realm before the Eastern Partnership summit in Novem-
ber 2013 will produce rewards. The EU’s incentive system is a strong 
one, and Ukrainian leaders know it, writes Sherr. On the other hand, 
he does not suggest that this benchmark should be the last opportunity 
for the current administration to achieve the agreements that have 
been negotiated for such a long time. True, the EU is an economic and 
political union, an entity which has the promotion of the human rights 
and good practices in governance and economics as its main goal. The 
best business practices are codified to strengthen connections between 
member states. In Ukraine, however, business practices diverge from 
EU standards; its business culture can be described as subordination of 
law to power rather than the other way around. In sum, there is a need 
to work towards harmonization of legislation and business practices in 
Ukraine and the EU, and Sherr holds that realism obliges us to admit 
that negotiations over this matter will remain at a dead end until there 
is a clear decision towards making the necessary changes in the busi-
ness culture and protection of human rights. But even if this is not 
within reach, the EU should be able to provide new incentives and ex-
planations beyond 2013, he suggests: any country aspiring for an 
agreement should have the right to know what is yet to be done, and 
the EU should provide this. 
 
Dr Alexander Duleba (Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia) 
takes a different approach from that of Sherr. He agrees that the crisis 
within the EU has further dimmed Ukraine’s prospects of member-
ship. Still, he holds that Ukraine is part of an ‘idealistic’ European 
project, and that the Eastern Partnership should evolve into an ‘um-
brella’ for sectoral approximation, mirroring the EEA agreement that 
Norway has with the EU. Duleba argues that ‘sooner or later, Ukraine 
will be able to comply with the EU’s norms and standards’ (p. 29), 
and induces a sense of optimism for Ukraine, based on the ability of 
both the EU and Ukraine to work on practical issues. Drawing on his 
vast experience in extending and explaining the incentive system of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) for Ukrainian officials, Duleba suggests 
that rather than wait until a country meets all the criteria of the acquis 
communautaire, the EU should ‘check’ whether these criteria are met 
for separate sectors; and, for each sector, provide incentives in the 
form of observer status, and a separate sectoral agreement. In this 
original contribution, Duleba turns the terms ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ 
upside-down. The idealistic view, he suggests, holds that EU culture 
can influence Ukrainian society only after there is an Association 
Agreement up and running, whereas a realistic view dictates that 
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moves should be made even before this, and the hitherto unused po-
tential of sector-based negotiation should be used to deepen sector-
based approximation.  
 
Taking as his point of departure that the Association Agreement be-
tween the EU and Ukraine is quite similar to the EEA with Norway, 
Duleba notes that the energy sector presents a unique field of coopera-
tion between the EU and Ukraine, in terms of scope and institutional 
shape. As yet, it is the only sector to be regulated by binding contrac-
tual relations (via the accession Protocol to the Energy Community), 
aimed at harmonizing Ukraine’s national legislation with that of the 
EU. To be sure, Duleba also recognizes that there are many obstacles 
created by both sides. The EU is a legal space with unified standards; 
and a state aspiring to become an associate member must comply with 
the standards in 31 sectors without having any influence on the 
framework for cooperation. Still, in this context, step-by-step harmo-
nization is a more appropriate path for cooperation than an Associa-
tion Agreement that obliges states to implement all changes at once, or 
else lose everything. 
 
Dr Olaf Osica (Centre for Eastern Studies) focuses explicitly on the 
normative dimension of governance and elections, arguing that 
Ukraine is still more than its laggard domestic politics, and definitely 
more than its government. The EU–Ukraine relationship is, he con-
tends, characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty in and around 
Ukraine about the direction of its foreign policies, but the benefits of 
cooperation with the EU are evident. Osica notes that the DCFTA 
would provide Ukraine access to a market of 500 million consumers 
valued to USD 17.6 trillion, compared to the domestic Ukrainian mar-
ket of 50 million consumers and a mere USD 165 billion. It would 
improve conditions for Ukrainian companies operating in the EU, as 
there would be a common legislative, technical and procedural 
framework for trade and investment and solution of trade disputes. In 
a long-term perspective, this would also facilitate the dialogue on visa 
liberalization and on access to the labour and educational market of 
the EU for ordinary Ukrainian citizens. However, EU officials today 
have serious doubts about the reliability of Ukraine as a partner. Only 
stronger commitment to free media and a viable emphasis on true – 
not selective – justice can improve this. The most important fact re-
mains, he notes, that ‘Yanukovych’s political tactics of having his 
cake and eating it too’ has proven ‘self-defeating’ (p. 44). Dr Osica 
concludes: ‘the politicization of the judiciary system and the abuse of 
administrative resources in violation of the rules of the democratic 
game must lead to a halt in the process of EU integration’ (p. 44).  
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Rounding off is Dr Grigory Perepelytsia (Institute of International 
Relations, Diplomatic Academy, Kiev). His contribution offers a 
strong argument for Ukraine to leave the conundrum of a dual periph-
ery between the EU and Russia, but seems less optimistic as to wheth-
er this will happen. Carving his argument in the rocks of geopolitics, 
he notes that the pace of European integration for Ukraine has been 
difficult and slow, and that a critical examination of processes in 
Ukrainian society is needed. He sees the main obstacle to European 
integration in the assumed failure of the Wider Europe project, but 
also Ukraine’s strategy of ‘dual integration’. At present, the Ukrainian 
government seems to harbour a principle of ‘double asymmetric inte-
gration’ (p. 58) which is dangerous for the sovereignty of the nation 
and the state. If pursued, this strategy would leave Ukraine as a divid-
ed peripheral country serving as a buffer zone. Moreover, it would 
lose sovereignty to both the EU and Russia, without gaining anything 
from either of them. Hence, he indicates, geography will prevail – also 
in the sense that Ukraine is a part of ‘Europe’ only in geographical 
terms, and that this is the main cause of Ukraine’s problems in estab-
lishing a national state and promoting democracy.  
Concluding Remarks 
Anniversaries have contexts, and contexts do not always call for big 
celebrations. As mentioned, this volume emerged as a result of a bilat-
eral conference held in the midst of the severance of relations between 
Brussels and Kiev, and was explicitly designed to discuss the relation-
ship between Norway and Ukraine in this larger setting. The major 
conclusion from the conference is clear: the lucrative deal offered by 
the EU to Ukraine suffers from lack of meeting standards of govern-
ment on the part of Ukraine. The year 2012 had been set to be a year 
of significant ‘European’ events, domestic as well as internationally. 
Instead, it proved to be a year in which politics returned to Wider Eu-
rope, curtailing the prospects for integration efforts in the EU neigh-
bourhood.  
 
This does not mean that anniversaries are events void of meaning or 
purpose. The purpose of the seminar held at Taras Shevchenko Uni-
versity in Kiev was to take stock of the bilateral relationship, and its 
wider context, politically as well as practically. There is indeed a rela-
tionship between the EU and Ukraine, and there is an EFTA Agree-
ment between the EFTA countries and Ukraine. The EU Foreign Af-
fairs Council concluded in December 2012 by reaffirming the EU’s 
engagement with Ukraine, but underlined that ‘a political association 
and economic integration [should be] based on the respect for com-
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mon values’.12 This, with the engagement of a third party like Nor-
way, should build on a clear understanding of the implications of 
Norway’s relationship to the EU; and second, not what this could 
mean for Ukraine, but rather the meaning of Ukraine’s current rela-
tionship with the EU. Norway’s EU relationship involves both foreign 
and domestic politics; it guides how we exercise our sovereignty; it 
secures a deeper integration between EU standards and national legis-
lation; it makes us part and parcel of the normative dimensions in the 
EU Charter on Human Rights (2000).13 For Ukraine, the relationship 
remains far more problematic – but the potential rewards are substan-
tial indeed.  
 
It is my hope that this small volume can provide some advice and in-
dicate some pathways out of what has become an impasse. I would 
like to express gratitude to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kiev, the 
University of Nordland; and the Taras Shevchenko University for col-
laboration and invaluable facilitation in arranging the seminar. Thanks 
also to numerous practitioners with long-standing experience in trade 
and in academic research, many of whom also know Ukraine very 
well. This helped to give the conference a practical dimension. The 
many participants could offer valuable insights into processes and 
challenges facing Ukraine today, also in the wider European context – 
a process which, let us hope, will not be one of ad calendas graecas.   
                                                 
12 Council conclusions on Ukraine, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 10 December 
2012.  
13 Norway has been doing well: In the period 1992–2011, GDP rose by 60% and employment 
by 25%, and in 2011, unemployment rates were at 2.4% only. About 2/3 of Norway’s 
trade and private investments are with the EU, and 50% of the Norwegian State Oil 
Fund’s investments are in European portfolios. Labour migration from EU countries tops 
the list of migrants: 87% of all labour migration to Norway in 2009 was from the EU. 
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Since declaring independence in 1991, Ukraine has defined itself as a 
European state. At the same time, Ukrainians are a Slavic people. To 
every Ukrainian president from Kravchuk to Yanukovych there has 
been no contradiction between these two identities. That is also true 
for the member states of the EU. In the UK and Norway, not to say 
Poland and Slovakia, anyone who characterized the Slavs as a ‘non-
European’ people would be regarded as uneducated.  
 
Yet, increasingly in the East Slavic world, there is a political line of 
argument to the effect that Slavic and European identities are some-
how different. The Kremlin and its ideologists have invested consider-
able energy in articulating this ‘civilizational’ difference between Eu-
rope and russkiy mir, which in the Russian mind includes Ukraine. In 
some parts of Ukraine, this soft-power project has resonance, and the 
reasons are not difficult to find. Over twenty years since independ-
ence, the majority of Ukrainians are not happy with the quality of their 
lives, the quality of their leaders, or the character of their relationship 
with the rest of Europe. All these things have brought disappointment, 
disillusionment and, in some quarters, feelings of betrayal. Moreover, 
Europe – the EU in particular – finds itself in crisis. 
 
This is not the first time that many are asking ‘what is Ukraine?’ But it 
is the first time in a considerable while that many are asking ‘what is 
Europe?’ Take Norway, for instance. It is in every sense a part of Eu-
rope, not only geographically, historically and culturally, but also in 
its institutions, standards and mode of governance. However, it is not 
a member of the EU, although it could be. It fully conforms to EU 
standards of governance, economic management and business culture. 
It also incorporates the majority of EU regulations and normative acts 
into its own national legislation. Yet it has opted to join the European 
Free Trade Association, EFTA. EFTA defines itself as an intergov-
ernmental organization devoted to free trade and economic integra-
tion. To this end, it has a worldwide network of Free Trade Agree-
ments, not confined to the European Economic Area – and this net-
work now includes Ukraine. 
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The European Union is something more ambitious than EFTA. It is an 
economic and political union of states that have freely chosen to 
‘pool’ (i.e. combine) specific elements of their national sovereignty. It 
is also a values-based organization. As stated on the official EU web-
site, ‘one of [its] main goals [is] to promote human rights, both inter-
nally and throughout the world’.1 It codifies standards of law, govern-
ance and best business practice, and these standards are reflected in 
nearly every relationship it pursues and every agreement it signs. The 
EU makes no secret of the fact that it sees the key to integration in 
harmonization of the internal policies of aspirant states and, with that, 
a transformation in the way in which institutions and economies work. 
This certainly applies to the Association Agreement (and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area) that it has negotiated, but not 
signed, with Ukraine.  
 
The fact that Ukraine has a Free Trade Agreement with EFTA and not 
with the EU is a reflection not of double standards, but of different 
goals and visions, a point which the members of these two organiza-
tions understand and accept. Ukraine’s Free Trade Agreement with 
EFTA is good in itself. But no one should regard it as a path to an EU 
Association Agreement (to which the DCFTA is linked), let alone EU 
membership. 
 
Given the ambitions of the EU and the standards it upholds in the as-
sociation and accession process, the current Euro crisis is not merely 
an economic crisis. Its dynamic has revealed that, in some domains, 
adherence to EU disciplines and standards has been surprisingly lax – 
critically so regarding members of the single currency, who undertook 
more stringent convergence requirements than those who chose to 
maintain their own currencies. Not only is it plain that several states of 
the Eurozone have failed to live up to their commitments, but that a 
number of other members have chosen to ignore that fact. For years, 
several Eurozone countries failed to observe ‘best practice’ in fiscal 
and economic management, the transparency and oversight of key in-
stitutions, as well as their accountability and probity. Thus, the EU’s 
crisis has been political and psychological as well as economic, and it 
has diminished the moral authority of the EU in Europe as a whole. 
 
However, it is important to maintain a sense of perspective – and, de-
spite much Russian prodding, Ukraine has done this. Despite the rig-
ours of the EU troika’s programmes and conditionalities, not even the 
most afflicted members of the Eurozone have sought to leave the 
zone, let alone the EU as a whole. As of this writing, there are still six 
designated candidates for membership and three ‘potential candi-
                                                 
1  http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm 
Surmounting an Impasse   21 
 
21 
dates’. With every utterance, Ukraine’s state leadership has reaffirmed 
EU integration as the country’s highest foreign policy priority. 
 
Yet, despite this official priority, there are serious obstacles between 
the EU and Ukraine, and the 25 February 2013 summit did virtually 
nothing to reverse the deteriorating dynamic. The most immediate 
problems arise from Ukraine’s failure to give serious attention to the 
three key issues raised by the European Council in May 2012: elec-
toral standards and practice, impartial justice and fundamental (judi-
cial, constitutional and economic) reform. But the obstacles are more 
far-reaching. Assessments of the present impasse will lack realism if 
they ignore the legacies of the past.  
Tenacious Legacies 
EU–Ukraine relations have been a source of frustration to both parties 
since 1991, despite the EU’s two enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and 
a significant intensification of the relationship. In the 1990s, the EU 
was a reserved and reluctant partner, and NATO led the field. Today 
this is no longer the case. It is now NATO’s approach to Ukraine that 
has become pro forma (not that Ukraine’s official non-bloc status has 
left it much choice); it is the European Commission and External Ac-
tion Service that are proactive, energized and engaged – and this de-
spite the greatest economic crisis in EU history. The EU–Ukraine As-
sociation Agreement, finalized in December 2011 but left unsigned, is 
a framework for de facto integration, and the recent summit provided 
a fresh opportunity for the President of the European Commission, 
José Manuel Barroso, to express his hope that Ukraine would achieve 
de jure integration (i.e. membership) in the fullness of time. 
 
Today the obstacles no longer derive from EU reticence. They arise 
from three sources: from Ukraine’s civic and political inheritance, 
from the political cum economic culture that arose after the Soviet col-
lapse, and from obstacles placed in Ukraine’s path by its own authori-
ties. Today the focus of attention is on the latter. But there is much to 
be said about the former, because the Soviet and Tsarist inheritance 
still colours the perceptions that Ukrainians have of their neighbours 
and themselves. 
 
Since 1991, Ukraine’s greatest liability has been the absence of a re-
spected political class willing and able to pursue its proclaimed goals 
and the ability to secure the trust of the country. Its second liability 
has been the divisions over the country’s identity, affinities and even 
its past. All post-Communist states suffered from painful legacies, but 
they did not all suffer from these particular weaknesses. The demise of 
the Warsaw Pact established immature democracies initially reliant on 
fragile or woefully compromised state institutions. However, in most 
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of Central Europe, the collapse also resurrected civic instincts, the 
values of the middle class, the ethos of private entrepreneurship and 
convictions about belonging to Europe. For these states – which in-
clude the three Baltic states of the former USSR – the psychological 
factor was overwhelmingly favourable. For them, the ‘return’ to Eu-
rope – and membership of NATO and the EU – was intrinsically fea-
sible. By contrast, most of Ukraine was not blessed with this heritage, 
let alone this psychological confidence. Not only was the Communist 
‘war against civil society’ more protracted than it was in Central Eu-
rope, national divisions had clear geopolitical implications. More to 
the point, the new political and economic elites of Ukraine were large-
ly post-Soviet elites rather than anti-Soviet elites. In contrast, and de-
spite the depredations of the Stalin era in the Baltic states – where at 
least a fifth of the citizens were liquidated – even these countries had 
counter-elites in place when the USSR collapsed: elites largely un-
tainted by nomenklaturist mores and values. 
 
Again, some qualifications are in order. It would be wrong to say that 
the nomenklaturist background of the elites charged with building 
Ukrainian statehood in the 1990s was an unmitigated disaster for the 
country. In some respects it was a blessing. A portion of the Soviet 
administrative class that aligned itself with Ukraine – whether out of 
pragmatism, opportunism or conviction – was competent and capable. 
It possessed qualities instrumental to state-building: an understanding 
of organization, institutions, policy-making and power. Ukraine’s 
deeply cultured and democratic anti-nomenklaturist elite had, for the 
most part, less understanding of these things, and the consequences 
became painfully obvious after Viktor Yushchenko came to power in 
2005.  
 
But the fact remains that Ukraine was not blessed in the way that Po-
land, Estonia or Czechoslovakia were: with people of the state who 
were also liberal and democratic in their culture. These gaps, contra-
dictions and discords within Ukraine’s governing system and between 
the system and its opponents can explain the ease with which 
Kuchma’s largely progressive first term metamorphosed – without any 
real obstruction or restraint from the top – into an increasingly ugly 
second term; they can also explain why the colossal expectations of 
the Orange Revolution were only partially understood by the Orange 
leaders and were very inadequately addressed. 
 
To many Ukrainians these contrasts are outweighed by the impression 
that the West supported the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the former 
Warsaw Pact countries and cold-shouldered Ukraine. Yet the image 
departs from reality in several important ways. For one thing, even 
NATO’s initial response to the Atlanticist aspirations of the three Vis-
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egrad countries was one of surprise and discomfort. Its 1995 Study on 
Enlargement had a theme but not a message. In its initial iterations, 
Partnership for Peace was more of an alternative to NATO member-
ship than a preparation for it, and this was bitterly resented in Poland 
most of all. The EU’s response was even cooler than NATO’s. What 
changed these attitudes were facts on the ground in Central Europe. 
Countries that behaved like future members had a prima facie claim to 
be treated like them. 
 
Ukraine’s experience reinforces this judgement in positive as well as 
negative ways. The mid-1990s were an exceptionally fruitful period in 
NATO–Ukraine relations, largely because the attitude of Ukraine’s 
defence establishment generated enthusiasm in the Alliance. In 2006, 
NATO’s expectations of granting a Membership Action Plan were 
foiled not by Berlin or Paris, or even by Moscow, but by (then) Prime 
Minister Yanukovych, who informed NATO HQ that Ukraine re-
quired a ‘pause’ in its relationship. Until the Orange Revolution, the 
EU’s attitude towards Ukraine had been palpably reserved, in part be-
cause of the Russian factor, but also because in the economic, busi-
ness and legal spheres there was very little to be enthusiastic about. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the result. Neverthe-
less, once Viktor Yushchenko came to office, everyone in Brussels 
knew that the ENP’s days were numbered, and the European Parlia-
ment even called for the granting of a membership perspective. It was 
the Orange team’s failures, not the EU’s coolness, that dissipated this 
impulse. 
 
Ukraine’s third liability is an economic system and business culture 
that is at variance with European norms and is damaging to the pros-
perity and potential of the country. It is a mutated system, a synthesis 
of contradictory elements, moulded in the crucible of Soviet break-
down. That breakdown accelerated the transfer of real power from the 
structures of ‘command-administration’ to the illicit and often crimi-
nal networks that had come to exercise de facto control over resources 
and their distribution. Today’s economic cum political order is an 
amalgam of two pathologies. The first arises from lapsed Leninist 
habits of governance: compartmentalization, administrative intrusive-
ness, the politicization of law, ‘divide and rule’ and, in everything, an 
obsessive regard for power. The second arises from the influence of 
‘shadow structures’: clannish, conspiratorial, predatory – and like 
Dzerzhinsky’s chekists (with whom their forebears fought and collab-
orated), beyond the reach of any law. In this world, understandings 
matter more than contracts, property rights are ephemeral, connections 
rather than rules decide disputes, and those without connections have 
neither money nor security for long.  
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Yet even in these malign conditions, there are important countervail-
ing factors. For Ukraine is not a closed world, and alongside these pa-
thologies and in the midst of them are individuals with high moral 
standards, civic-mindedness, experience of life in rules-based cultures 
and patriotism. Just as the pathologies have grown, so have these 
tendencies grown as well. They are increasingly widespread amongst 
the young, the university educated (military and civilian) as well as 
the small and medium entrepreneurs, for whom European values and 
standards are a matter of material self-interest. Today the majority of 
the country is divided between those who despise and those who 
loathe what they see around them. Yet this majority has found no 
route to political power, and neither the country’s leaders nor the es-
tablishmentarian opposition has found a route to them. Unlike physi-
cal vacuums, political vacuums are not always filled. Ukrainians have 
fled from politics. Until they recover their political voice, the country 
will deteriorate, and so will its international relationships.  
Obduracy and Deafness 
For twenty years, the habitual response of Ukraine’s authorities to the 
conditions described has been integration by declaration. Rather than 
producing real changes, they produce programmes about changes; ra-
ther than enforcing laws, they produce new laws. Over the same peri-
od, Ukraine’s leaders have also assumed that their country’s future is 
of existential importance to the West. In its positive iterations, this 
presupposes a prima facie Western interest in keeping Ukraine out of 
Russia’s grasp, irrespective of the country’s shortcomings and the un-
willingness of its leaders to address them. In its negative iterations, 
this presupposes a willingness to sacrifice Ukraine as part of a grand 
bargain with Russia. Encouraging behaviour by the West validates the 
first view; discouraging behaviour validates the second. A third and 
related continuity is the paucity of people who take the West at its 
word. Such people have been a minority in every government, and in 
Yanukovych’s administration, they seem not to exist at all. Alongside 
ignorance about Western motivations is a fourth continuity: ignorance 
about the West’s knowledge. Here, Ukrainians can be forgiven. After 
all, many prominent Westerners know little about Ukraine, and some 
will believe anything they want to hear. The point missed is that, in-
side and outside offices of state, there are also well-placed experts 
who know at least as much about Ukraine (or the matter in question) 
as their Ukrainian interlocutors. 
 
All this said, there have been important variations. Under Kravchuk, 
Kuchma and Yushchenko, real changes took place. The problem is 
that these changes were rarely consolidated; positive steps were often 
accompanied by negative ones, and they were halted or reversed the 
moment they threatened existing prerogatives and the system of pow-
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er. Yushchenko’s views about Europe were shaped by civilizational 
factors even more than geopolitical ones. This represented an im-
mensely promising change, as it gave his administration a basis of 
conviction that others lacked. Yet these convictions were also an im-
pediment to practical judgement. Yushchenko regarded Europe, in es-
sence, as an ethno-cultural, Greco-Roman and Christian civilization, 
and believed that Ukraine was organically part of it. He acted as if the 
challenge was to integrate with the Europe of 1905, not the Europe of 
2005: an increasingly multi-cultural entity defined less by heritage 
than by values, standards and the harmonization of institutions. Be-
cause he viewed Ukraine as primordially European, he underestimated 
the challenges of ‘returning’ to it. By replacing ‘bad’ people with 
‘good’ people, he assumed this would happen by itself. 
 
The failings of the Yanukovych administration are of an entirely dif-
ferent order. They have surprised the Western establishments who 
rightly praised the legitimacy of the elections that brought him to 
power. The Brussels and Washington consensus of 2010 was that 
Yanukovych had grown more moderate during the Orange years, that 
he would be a pragmatist and consolidator, conscious of the need for 
effectiveness and competence in government. In every one of these 
respects, they have been disappointed. Few in either capital would 
dispute the widespread Ukrainian verdict: that Yanukovych has 
‘drawn a line through [Ukraine’s] democratic achievements and me-
thodically replaced national values with those of the Family’.2 The 
personalization [personifikatsiya] of institutions, begun with benign 
intent by Yushchenko, has acquired a malign scale and direction. Not 
only is it necessary to note that key offices of state (Procuracy, State 
Tax Service, Ministry of Interior, State Security) have been captured 
by narrow and pecuniary interests, we must also ask whether the ele-
mentary principles of statehood are being forgotten in this process.3 
As Geir Flikke has noted, Europeanization ‘implies that the state has 
the capacity both to exercise sovereignty and pool it in discrete areas’ 
(p. 10). It is also predicated on values, which are not codified abstrac-
tions, but habits of mind and heart. None of these points seems to be 
recognized by Ukraine’s current authorities. 
After November 2013, what? 
In three respects, the EU has articulated a vision towards Ukraine that 
belies every established Ukrainian stereotype about its ethos and hori-
zons. Firstly, as affirmed by Commissioner Stefan Füle, the EU–
Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA are the ‘most ambitious 
and complex agreements the European Union has ever negotiated with 
                                                 
2  Tatyana Silina, ‘Half an Hour Before Spring’ [Za polchasa do vesniy], Zerkalo Nedeli 
[Mirror of the Week], 1 March 2013. 
3  Mykola Siruk interview with James Sherr, Den’ [The Day], Kyiv, 26 February 2013. 
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a third country’.4 They provide neither a membership perspective, nor 
a substitute for it. What they offer is tangible integration, consistent 
with the hope expressed by no less a figure than EU Commission 
President Barroso that membership will one day follow. Second, these 
agreements have been hammered out in the teeth of unprecedented 
economic pressures against doing nothing of the kind. The Eurozone 
crisis has dilated vision as well as narrowed it – not only within the 
currency zone itself, but across the EU as a whole. Third, negotiations 
have been reinforced by an intensity of diplomatic activity and high-
level engagements that should cast no doubt on the EU’s seriousness. 
 
Officially, the EU still adheres to the position that ‘as soon as there is 
determined action and tangible progress by Ukraine on the bench-
marks’, the Agreement will be signed and put forward for ratification, 
‘possibly by the time of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in 
November 2013’ (emphasis added).5  According to the EU Council 
Conclusions of December 2012: 
 
Ukraine’s performance…will be assessed on the basis of progress in three areas: 
the compliance of the 2012 parliamentary elections’ with international standards 
and follow-up actions, as well as Ukraine’s progress in addressing the issue of 
selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and in implementing the reforms 
defined in the jointly agreed Association Agenda.6 
  
Yet with increasing frequency, representatives of the EU Presidency, 
the Commission, the External Action Service and the European Parlia-
ment have articulated a distinctly different perspective: that Vilnius 
will be the last opportunity Ukraine has to take the steps required. 
This is not only a tactical mistake, but one that could have strategic 
and long-term consequences. 
 
This is not because, as the current Ukrainian authorities maintain, the 
EU is demanding the impossible. It is not. Were Ukraine governed by 
those who understood the EU’s ethos and shared it, some of the most 
important steps could be taken in a matter of days; others in a matter 
of weeks. It would be enough to entrust leadership of key departments 
of state to individuals of decency and proven professional merit. Some 
opposition figures now incarcerated could be released (not ‘par-
doned’) and charges against them dismissed; others could be released 
pending a proper judicial review conforming to EU standards. To be 
sure, such measures would require broadening the Presidential Ad-
ministration and Cabinet of Ministers, but the beneficiaries might in-
clude people of principle and standing, now side-lined, from the Party 
                                                 
4  Stefan Füle, ‘Speech at the Meeting of the EU–Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee, June 2012’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-448_en.htm>  
5  http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm   
6  EU Council Conclusions on Ukraine`: 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 
10 December 2012. 
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of Regions and its parliamentary allies. They might also include tal-
ented and younger individuals from the second and third echelons of 
state administration, representatives of honest and successful  
businesses, not to mention seasoned professionals who take pride in 
being ‘above party’. The EU is not demanding a change in Ukraine’s 
condition, but a change in its direction. It is also demanding that 
Ukraine’s leaders put the country first. Yet the odds are that this will 
not take place, and the EU cannot be faulted for this. Where, then, is 
the EU at fault? 
 
The EU’s first error, finally being addressed, is one of communica-
tion. The EU has been expert at making the simple appear complicat-
ed, but it is gradually learning the art of simplification. Reading the 
906-page Association Agreement would be beyond the task of any 
layperson. In fairness, it is not designed for a lay public – and the 
Ukrainian bureaucrat, like the EU bureaucrat, requires a reference 
even if he does not require a bible. At least now there is a five-page 
guide to the Association Agreement, but it is difficult to find on the 
EEAS website and does not appear to be published in Ukrainian.  
 
The EU’s second and greater error is one of expectation. Nothing has 
altered the view of Yanukovych as we described it in 2010: ‘geopoli-
tics is the extension and the servant of the process of regime creation 
and perpetuation’.7 Nor has anything occurred to alter the axiom un-
derpinning the culture of power: ‘the purpose of power is to gain more 
of it’.8 These are not perceptions or principles, but hardened reflexes. 
They do not describe differences of intellect, but of mentality; they are 
sociological rather than civilizational. They might be unenlightened, 
but they are not irrational. They put Viktor Yanukovych in power 
(first in Donetsk, then in Kiev), and they keep him there. 
 
None of this implies that Yanukovych’s policy towards the EU is 
sham. It is simply transactional. Conditionalities that are concretely 
and narrowly defined will be understood:  ‘You release Lutsenko, and 
we will do X; you release Tymoshenko, and we will do X and Y’. But 
the ethos of the EU will not be understood and its values will not be 
internalized, no matter how many carrots are offered or how much 
personal diplomacy takes place. Nor will the essential priority – re-
gime perpetuation – be altered. If Ms Ashton and Messrs Rompuy and 
Füle have not understood this by now, why not? If they have, then 
why have they made November 2013 Ukraine’s last chance? If Messrs 
Yatsenyuk and Lutsenko were in power, such an approach might 
make sense. But under Yanukovych, it makes no sense at all. 
                                                 
7  Yuriy Onyshkiv interview with James Sherr, ‘Yanukovych Has Miscalculated’, Kyiv Post, 
30 May 2010. 
8  James Sherr, The Mortgaging of Ukraine’s Independence, Chatham House Briefing Pa-
per, REP BP 2010/01, August 2010, p 4. 
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The greatest error is one of optic. If the EU means what it says, it is 
willing to visit the sins of Ukraine’s authorities on the country: a 
country which in increasing measure despises and loathes what is tak-
ing place. The current political dispensation in Ukraine is obdurate but 
brittle. Rigidity should not be confused with stability. Civil society is 
again becoming a factor, and it is relearning the art of governing with-
out government (without cues from the established opposition either – 
note the Kiev snow emergency of 2013). By one measure, Yuriy 
Lutsenko’s release from prison was an inadequate response to EU de-
mands. By another, it was a political miscalculation, because the ini-
tial signs are that prison has transformed him (like Russia’s 
Khodorkovskiy) into a serious figure who might help to change the 
game. By November 2013, the EU might have grounds to walk away 
from the authorities, but why walk away from the country? The con-
sequences of doing so – a turn towards hard authoritarianism internal-
ly and Russia externally, with all the attendant risks of civil conflict 
and fragmentation – would affect the EU’s priorities whether Brussels 
likes this or not. 
 
It would be best if these consequences were avoided: and indeed, there 
are better ways of doing so than the ‘now or never’ approach. Assum-
ing as we prudently must that Kiev will not meet EU requirements by 
November  2013, the EU’s priority task should be to dispel confusion 
in Ukraine and focus minds. First, it should explain concretely and to 
the widest possible audience why the Association Agreement cannot 
yet be signed. This means highlighting areas of progress, inaction and 
regression since the February summit. Second, and with the utmost 
emphasis, the EU should underscore that its core requirements are 
basic, simple and instinctual to those who share its commitments and 
its purpose. Third, it should state openly what Barroso has stated pri-
vately: that Ukraine belongs in Europe and that the only factor keep-
ing it out of Europe is Ukraine itself. The EU should not become the 
unwitting ally of those who would exclude it permanently. 
 
 
Ukraine and Europe: Transforming the 
Eastern Partnership 
Alexander Duleba  
 
 
 
The recent Eurozone crisis has engendered a new phase of institution-
al reforms within the EU. This indicates that the Union is again fo-
cused on internal issues, bringing certain pessimism into the discourse 
on EU enlargement, and dimming prospects for any new country to 
achieve membership, except perhaps Croatia.1 As a consequence of 
the crisis, the Eastern Partnership countries, including Ukraine, have 
disappeared from the horizon of potential EU membership. Moreover, 
the political stalemate in current EU–Ukraine relations (due to criti-
cism from EU institutions on legal sanctions against members of the 
former ‘Orange government’ in Ukraine) offers few hopes for a 
change anytime soon – quite the contrary.  
 
Nevertheless, I believe that a multi-layered European integration pro-
ject with the EU as its pillar will serve as a beacon for navigating the 
difficult waters of the recent crisis, as has been the case several times 
in the past. Further, I believe that, sooner or later, Ukraine will be able 
to comply with the EU norms and standards, including in the area of 
rule of law and functioning of democratic institutions. With these two 
assertions, we may contemplate two positive visions: Ukraine in Eu-
rope, and/or Europe in Ukraine.  
 
The first vision is rather an idealistic one of Ukraine as part of the Eu-
ropean project. This involves a normative interpretation of the project: 
how it should be understood and what it should concern for Europe, in 
a normative interpretation valid for and with Ukraine. Arguably, this 
is a goal that will require hard and focused work, both in the EU and 
in Ukraine.  
 
The second one is a more realistic vision of a potential upgrade of pre-
sent-day EU–Ukraine relations within the existing institutional 
                                                 
  This article builds on findings from research conducted by the Research Centre of the 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association on issues related to the EU’S Eastern policy. See  au-
thor’s list of publications under About the Contributors.  
1  Croatia became a member of the European Union as of 1 July 2013. [Editor’s comment] 
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framework of the Eastern Partnership. Very importantly – it means 
ignoring the political stalemate in the current EU–Ukraine dialogue.  
 
Here I will outline these two visions, and, in the third part of this arti-
cle, argue that the EU also stands to blame for the existing problems in 
its relations with Ukraine. It would be wrong to treat Ukraine as the 
sole troublemaker in bilateral EU–Ukraine relations. I hold that, since 
2004, the EU has made some mistakes in developing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership (2009). 
There is a need to review the existing strategic framework for the 
EU’s Eastern policy – in order, first, to make it into a more efficient 
policy from the EU perspective; second, to make it a more efficient 
tool for Ukraine and other East European countries in their processes 
of European integration, including their post-Soviet transformation.  
An idealistic vision of ‘European project’ and Ukraine as a part of it  
First of all, let us define what is to be understood by the term ‘the Eu-
ropean project’. A highly simplified definition runs as follows: the 
project implies an integrated space of European nations (and/or ‘unit-
ed Europe’) that respect fundamental European values and political 
principles (democracy, individual freedom, respect to human rights, 
rule of law), and work together on common rules and policies that are 
recognized and applied by all participating nations. In referring to a 
‘European project’ and/or a ‘united Europe’, we should understand a 
Europe of democracies, each of which recognizes and adheres to the 
same political values.  
 
Thus, a ‘united Europe’ might be envisaged as a common area of four 
freedoms based on common standards and rules. Such a European 
project is possible only as a legal project based on commonly shared 
European public law. This law is both a joint consensual deal between 
participating nations, and an entity capable of integrating domestic 
and international law to the extent of being obligatory to all members. 
That does not mean an end to sovereign nations in Europe; rather, it 
means a new ‘integrative reading’ of sovereignty that is shared by the 
states participating in the European project. They are sovereign to the 
extent that they have access to the shaping of common rules – rules 
that they in turn must follow. The less access they have to the for-
mation of common rules they have to follow, the less sovereign will 
they be. In this perspective, the European integration process is a  
multi-layered project that evolves in several circles; the countries of 
Europe differ in their degree of participation in common policies, and 
as regards their access to the formation of common rules.    
 
In Europe today, the dominant source of European public law is, un-
questionably, the acquis communautaire of the EU. Within more than 
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30 common and sectoral policies, the EU produces normative acts 
which directly impact the daily lives of almost 500 million people in 
its 27 member states, but also indirectly affect the daily lives of people 
in other countries that are non-EU but still European nations. That is 
possible thanks to the economic strength of the EU single market – 
and the current Eurozone crisis will change nothing in this respect – 
with its pull-effect on other European economies; furthermore, the EU 
still represents an attractive model of political modernization for the 
former Eastern bloc countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Eu-
rope.  
 
The alternative scenario to the European project is a return to 19th cen-
tury Europe with a concert of some big European powers – which, we 
should recall, in the end ‘disconcerted’ Europe by bringing it into two 
world wars. Today there are only two European countries that position 
themselves – at least, as shown by their political leaderships for the 
past two decades – as not interested in being a part of the EU-based 
European project: these are Russia and Belarus. Now, what is good for 
Russia or Belarus might be good for Russia and Belarus, but it does 
not offer solutions to the future of Europe – moreover, neither Russia 
nor Belarus can ignore their own complex historical heritage. Today 
the question of what Europe is, where it starts from and where it ends 
has nothing to do with geography. 
 
A pertinent example is the ‘Turkey debate’ within the EU. It started in 
the context of ‘where the borders of Europe are’ versus that of ‘where 
the future borders of the EU will end’, and has become a confusing 
debate that leads nowhere. Any answer to the question of future ‘Eu-
ropean borders’, or the outer ‘borders of the European integration pro-
ject’ ( ‘where Europe starts from and where does it end’) must, almost 
explicitly, be political. And those who provide the answer are the Eu-
ropean non-EU countries, not the EU itself. And yet, the EU cannot 
retreat from its ‘pan-European’ agenda, which has been an inherent 
part of its values and purpose from the very beginning of the European 
integration process in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
 
It is easy to criticize the EU for its many shortcomings. Political par-
ties may lament loss of sovereignty, and outsider countries may see 
the EU as a massive bureaucracy.  However, there is nothing else that 
could be termed the ‘European project’ for the 21st century. The EU 
has been able to manage both the deepening and widening of the inte-
gration process through the expansion of the four freedoms, communi-
ty laws and standards, and by improving its institutional framework 
and decision-making process. 
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It was a turning point in the history of the EU when the enlargement 
policy became part of its foreign policy. The accession of three rela-
tively poor and post-authoritarian South European countries in the 
1980s – Greece, Portugal and Spain – had a profound impact on the 
institutional framework and financial arrangements within what was 
then the European Economic Community (EEC). It pushed the EEC to 
seek a new institutional framework, which ultimately resulted in the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (valid from 1993), in turn trans-
forming the EEC into the European Union. The grand enlargement of 
2004/2007 and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty further strengthened 
the institutional framework, and revealed the EU’s capacities to adjust 
internally while also drawing states around the EU closer to its core.  
 
The accession of economically less-developed and relatively poor 
countries forced the development of new solidarity instruments in or-
der to maintain the political stability and economic prosperity of the 
new members. Finally, the enlargement brought a new dimension into 
the EU’s external policy. The European Union became a key interna-
tional actor in Europe, exporting prosperity and stability to countries 
pursuing freedom and democracy. First, it brought stability and pros-
perity to Southern Europe by including Greece, Spain and Portugal in 
the 1980s. Then the EU accession of ten post-Communist countries 
together with Cyprus and Malta in the past decade significantly expan-
ded its borders towards Eastern Europe. And finally, the EU is today 
the guarantor of stability, peace and modernization in the Western 
Balkans. Southern Europe, Central Europe and the Balkans have be-
come part and parcel of the European integration project.  
 
Although there are many things that the EU cannot do in external rela-
tions, it can export its community law and standards to the neighbour-
hood. Its member states may disagree on various international issues, 
especially on relations with Eastern neighbours and Russia. However, 
within the EU there is consensus that it should promote the moderni-
zation of its neighbourhood through the export of its standards of gov-
ernance. If there is any European neighbouring country that wants to 
follow the EU way of modernization, the Union can assist it in this 
effort. That was precisely why the EU launched the ENP in 2004 and 
the Eastern Partnership in 2009. Both these policies have provided a 
strategic framework and conditions for the participation of Ukraine in 
the European integration project. 
A realistic vision: Norway’s relations with the EU as a pattern for 
Ukraine  
Until recently, Ukraine has been the focal point of the Eastern Partner-
ship. Together with Moldova, it managed to engage with the EU on 
the full spectrum of the Eastern Partnership activities. In the bilateral 
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track, the Eastern partners were offered new contractual relations with 
the EU, including the possibility of new Association Agreements 
(AA) with adjacent Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
(DCFTA). The new contractual arrangements should replace the Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), the aim being to facili-
tate the gradual integration of Eastern partners’ economies into the EU 
single market. As stated by the European Trade Commissioner, Karel 
de Gucht:  
 
[…] these Association Agreements will provide one of the most ambitious levels 
ever of political association between the EU and a foreign country. They will af-
fect businesses and citizens in several concrete ways since they cover most as-
pects of economic life – from consumer protection to company law, from envi-
ronmental protection to education and training. They include a major trade com-
ponent – a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement or DCFTA in the 
jargon – which is the key driver for economic integration between the EU and 
the region.2 
 
Ukraine was the first Eastern Partnership country to conclude talks 
with the EU on a sectoral part of its Association Agreement (AA). The 
chapters on Institutional, General and Final Provisions, Political Dia-
logue and Reform, Political Association, and Cooperation and Con-
vergence in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy, including all 
chapters on Economic and Sector Cooperation (31 sectoral segments), 
were provisionally closed already in October 2009. Thereafter, the EU 
and Ukraine conducted talks on the signing of a Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Finally, in October 2011 – exactly 
two years after the conclusion of sectorial part of AA – the EU and 
Ukraine concluded their talks on DCFTA at the technical working 
level. However, as we know, the political timing was unfortunate.  
 
While full-fledged membership is not acceptable politically at present, 
the EaP countries, if and when they are internally ready, should get a 
clear perspective of associated membership. In my view, this perspec-
tive should reach beyond short-term partnership and emulate the mod-
el of the EU’s relations with the countries of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). After concluding the AA and DCFTA Ukraine will, as an 
EaP country, find itself in a similar situation to countries that have 
concluded EEA agreements with the EU: Norway, Iceland and Lich-
tenstein.3 Experts from EEA countries can participate in the work of 
the EU sectoral working groups as observers without voting rights, but 
entitled to present their arguments on new EU legislation.  
                                                 
2  K. de Gucht: ‘EU trade policy looking East’. Speech at the Civil Society Trade Seminar, 
Warsaw, 3 October 2011.   
3  According to of the European Commission representatives who were participating in the 
talks on AA with Ukraine, the AAs under EaP include the same provisions as the EEA 
agreements. Author’s interviews in Brussels, 7 May 2010. 
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The EU should consider observer status for EaP countries along the 
lines of the EEA model. To this end, the EaP should foster network-
like relations between the EU and EaP countries, ensuring constant 
interactions and reinforcing trust and predictability of actions based on 
mutual reciprocity. This will allow Ukraine to obtain access to the 
formation of the acquis communautaire. In other words, this is a way 
for Ukraine to become a part of the EU’s institutions without full poli-
tical membership. The EEA model could represent an effective pro-
gramme for integrating Ukraine into Europe under the current political 
and economic conditions. 
 
In the energy sector, there are in fact precedents for an EEA-like sta-
tus for Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU. The following three bilateral docu-
ments comprise the fundamental institutional framework for EU–
Ukraine cooperation in energy: the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA, from 1998), the Memorandum of Understanding on 
co-operation in the field of energy (from 2005), and the Protocol con-
cerning the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty establishing the Energy 
Community (ratified in 2010, entered into force from 2011). The PCA 
refers to provisions of the European Energy Charter as the normative 
and legal framework document for cooperation between the EU and 
third countries as regards energy. The 2005 Memorandum of Under-
standing sets out the ambition of the EU and Ukraine to upgrade their 
cooperation in the field of energy. This entails facilitation of the inte-
gration of the Ukrainian electricity and gas markets into the EU’s in-
ternal energy market. For this to be realized, however, Ukraine must 
implement key elements of the EU’s acquis communautaire on ener-
gy, the environment, competition and renewables. The Memorandum 
assumes that the goal is to be achieved via Ukraine’s acceding to the 
Energy Community. Finally, on 24 September 2010 Ukraine signed 
the Protocol concerning its accession to the Energy Community, be-
coming a full member on 1 February 2011. The Protocol includes the 
list of energy acquis of the EU which Ukraine is obliged to follow, 
along with the timeline for implementation. Ukraine’s energy obliga-
tions as identified by the Protocol became a separate part of the Asso-
ciation Agreement’s chapter on energy, one of the total 31 sectoral 
chapters of the agreement. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement is 
to absorb provisions of the accession Protocol to the Energy Commu-
nity on entering into force.  
 
The energy sector presents a unique field for collaboration between 
the EU and Ukraine, in terms of both scope and institutional shape. It 
is as yet the only sector to be regulated by binding contractual rela-
tions (via the accession Protocol to the Energy Community), and 
aimed at harmonizing Ukraine’s national legislation with that of the 
EU. Energy might become the first sector where Ukraine can achieve 
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real integration with the EU. Ukraine’s experts participate in the work 
of European Energy Community together with experts from other 
countries. Energy Community expertise is a key source for the EU in 
drawing up new common legislation to regulate the energy sectors of 
participating countries, including the internal market of the EU. 
 
The principal question is thus: Can this EEA-like model in the energy 
sector be applied to the 30 other sectors covered by the Association 
Agreement between EU and Ukraine? There was a strong momentum 
in the EU Eastern policy in the course of 2006/2007, when the gradual 
sectoral integration of Eastern neighbours in a ‘step by step’ and/or 
‘sector by sector’ manner was seen as a grand strategy for further up-
grading the ENP. That was replaced by the EaP of 2009, with its am-
bitious offer to Eastern neighbours to conclude a complex Association 
Agreement with an adjacent DCFTA. In view of the current achieve-
ments of the EaP, we may conclude that the EU’s offer has been too 
ambitious to be absorbed by Eastern neighbours, including Ukraine. Is 
it possible for the EU to combine both approaches in its policy to-
wards Eastern neighbours? This will be the fundamental question for 
the EU if it should wish to revitalize its Eastern policy in the years to 
come. 
Obstacles on the EU side and/or question marks related to existing EU 
policy   
The aim of the EaP is, pursuant to the EU documents on Eastern Part-
nership, including the ENP (2004), to assist neighbouring and inter-
ested countries in the process of democratization and modernization. 
Therefore, its success should be measured not by the name of the 
agreement (or its intentions), but primarily by the quantity and quality 
of reforms it has brought to partner countries. Since the ENP/EaP pol-
icy applies the logic of the EU enlargement policy (without enlarge-
ment promises: that is, without strict conditionality for the partner 
country), the progress of the EaP depends on the voluntary decision of 
each EaP country to harmonize its legislation with the EU legislation 
and policies. The scope of political will of EaP countries to go farther 
and deeper in approximation with the EU acquis, however, varies with 
the political preferences of EaP governments and the political culture 
of the EaP societies. That is why the Action Plan as the key imple-
mentation instrument of the ENP for the period 2004–2009 (Associa-
tion Agenda, in the case of Ukraine since 2009) was a policy docu-
ment, and not a contract. Nevertheless, research conducted by RC 
SFPA has shown that the former ENP Action Plan brought more re-
forms to Ukraine in the years 2005 to 2009 than the EaP Association 
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Agenda, which was launched as the main implementation instrument 
of EaP in 2009.4 
 
In the past, the success of EU enlargement policy has hinged on a 
conditional relationship between the EU and the candidate country 
based on the principle of obligatory approximation with the member-
ship standards of the former. That is not the case in a partnership 
and/or neighbourhood policy. The EaP has been presented as an offer 
or initiative for partner countries. It is up to them to pick the cherries – 
how many and which ones – from the EU menu. Nevertheless, there is 
scope for strengthening both the conditionality and obligatory dimen-
sions of the EU’s relations with an EaP partner country. Moreover, the 
more this relationship is based on conditionality and the more it car-
ries a contractual character, the better it is for the EU’s ability to press 
for reforms and modernization in its neighbourhood. If that is the goal 
of the EaP, the EU should reform the EaP so that it encompasses con-
tractual elements and enhances conditionality. The present situation of 
Ukraine shows that the EaP offer of 2008 with AA/DCFTA has prov-
en overly ambitious for partner countries. We now need to think about 
how to strengthen contractual relations between the EU and partner 
countries by adopting agreements that they can absorb. 
 
In addition to the Action Plan of 2004, the EU offered a set of sectoral 
tools to its neighbours during the EU Presidency of Finland (second 
half of 2006) and of Germany (first half of 2007). The idea of expand-
ing sector tools of cooperation within ENP was based on the German 
proposal for the ENP Plus. The Communication of 4 December 2006 
called for building a thematic dimension within the ENP: a regional 
and sectorial cooperation framework for EU interaction with ENP 
countries.5 The Communication also stated the urgent need for multi-
lateral agreements between the EU and ENP countries, especially in 
the sectors of energy and transport. It suggested a path to achieve such 
arrangements by extending the Energy Community Treaty to ENP 
countries that are both willing and ready to adopt the respective EU 
sector-based acquis. In this way, the EC Communication laid the 
foundations for developing a distinct regional policy for the EU and a 
cooperative framework for its Eastern neighbourhood. 
 
Another element of the ENP that was included in the above Commu-
nication was the possibility for the ENP countries to participate in the 
EU Community Programmes and Agencies. The Commission has been 
mandated to develop separate Community Programmes for the ENP 
                                                 
4  See Alexander Duleba and Vladimír Bilčík, Taking Stock of the Eastern Partnership in 
Ukraine, Moldova, Visegrad Four, and the EU (Bratislava: RC SFPA, 2011). 
5  ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’. Commission of the European Com-
munities, Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006)726 final.    
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countries that represent a qualitatively new ENP instrument; this leads 
beyond the horizon of the original concept of the neighbourhood poli-
cy expressed by former Commission President, Romano Prodi, as 
‘everything, but institutions’. The ENP countries that qualify for the 
Community Programmes will indeed be granted access to community 
policies of the Union within the respective programmes and agencies. 
 
The new formula of the neighbourhood policy proposed by the EU in 
2006/2007 to the ENP partners who were both willing and ready to go 
beyond the Action Plan could be summarized as follows: contractual 
sectoral relationship based on two fundamental principles – obligato-
ry approximation to the respective EU sectoral acquis and subsequent 
access to the EU sectoral programmes and institutions. Although the 
relevant EU documents do not mention the originally proposed ENP 
Plus instrument as a ‘sectoral agreement’, access to the Community 
programmes and agencies implies that the ENP countries should con-
clude sectoral agreements and/or protocols relevant for this access. 
 
In this way, the EU has evolved to a higher level than that of the ENP; 
and indeed, even the ENP has gone beyond the horizon of the original 
definition of an instrument that offered ‘everything, but institutions’. 
The first level of the ENP means that the EU dialogue with an ENP 
country on political and sectorial issues follows the Action Plan 
(and/or the Association Agenda in the case of Ukraine from 2009), 
which is a political document without binding implications for the 
ENP country or for the EU. The access protocol of the ENP country to 
a Community programme and/or Agency stipulates that the respective 
sectoral dialogue should be framed by a binding agreement. The ex-
pectation of the EU institutions and the member states is that approx-
imation to the EU acquis and access to the EU institutions will create 
a common space between the Union and the ENP country  – ‘sectoral 
integration’ with the EU. The regional dimension notwithstanding, the 
EU could apply a principle of ‘sectoral integration’ with ready and 
willing individual partner countries by adopting scaled-down sectoral 
agreements. 
 
However, the EaP concept, as proposed by Swedish–Polish EaP initia-
tive in 2008, re-wrote the sector-by-sector approach developed in 
2006/2007, offering instead an ambitious ‘singular and big’ AA/ 
DCFTA contractual deal. We can now see deceleration of sectoral re-
forms in the partner countries as well as an emerging contractual 
stalemate with the EaP-pioneering Ukraine. No, I do not argue that 
sectoral agreements are in any way in contradiction with the path of-
fered by the EaP and the talks on comprehensive and cross-sectorial 
agreements within the Association Agreements. I suggest that if the 
EaP country is ready to make significant progress within a given sec-
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tor, it should be offered a sectoral agreement in addition to the AA, 
which basically will represent a list of provisional arrangements for 
EaP countries in various fields. If the EaP country is both willing and 
ready to proceed in a specific sector, it should be given a higher level 
of contractual relationship with the EU. And once the AA talks are 
completed, such sector-based agreements can become integral parts of 
the AA. 
 
In sum, if a partner country is ready to follow an EU sectoral acquis 
fully, it should be offered a binding sectoral agreement, and the EU 
should open its institutions to such a partner country, thereby mirror-
ing its arrangements in the EEA agreement with Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. As noted, the EEA states can participate in Internal 
Market and relevant Community Programmes and Agencies, albeit 
without voting rights. The point is that the EEA states are present in 
EU institutions with their experts and are entitled to consult any new 
relevant EU legislation at an early stage of preparation.  
 
The possibility for an EaP country to conclude a sectoral agreement 
with the EU should be open exclusively to those countries that are 
ready to accept and follow respective sectoral acquis of the EU fully. 
Given full compliance with the EU’s acquis in a given policy sector, 
the partner country might achieve the status of an observer in EU in-
stitutions. The EaP countries should be given transparent and clear 
benchmarks, so that they can know where they are moving in relation 
to the EU within the EaP. The granting of observer status for sectoral 
agreements – as proposed by ENP Plus – should become the funda-
mental idea of the Eastern Partnership: this is in absolute correspond-
ence with the declared need to enhance the EU’s commitment toward 
its Eastern neighbours, and vice versa. Consideration should also be 
given to the possibility of transforming future AAs into EEA-like 
agreements, allowing for the same institutional observer status for EaP 
countries. 
 
If this can become reality, we may conclude that the reform of the 
EU’s Eastern policy as outlined above will decisively improve the 
prospects for the deeper integration of Ukraine into Europe – and it 
will bring Europe to Ukraine as well.  
Ukraine and Europe: Why Ukraine is 
more than Yanukovych  
Olaf Osica* 
 
 
 
The year 2012 was supposed to be a watershed, marking a profound 
and lasting breakthrough in relations between Ukraine and the Euro-
pean Union, and paving the way for Ukraine’s gradual integration 
with the EU. Instead, 2012 marked the onset of a strategic pause be-
tween the two, foreclosing the prospects of Ukraine’s approximation 
to the EU.  
 
The hopes for a paradigmatic shift in EU–Ukraine relations were root-
ed in the fact that after three years of negotiations, the EU and Ukraine 
initialled the Association Agreement (AA) in March 2012, and the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) in 
July 2012. Both agreements open up prospects for Ukraine’s gradual 
and sectorial integration with the EU. Whereas AA includes a set of 
political goals to be met by Ukraine in the area of democratic free-
doms, the scope of the DCFTA is by far more extensive than that of a 
typical free trade agreement. Firstly, it envisages a complete liberali-
zation of trade through lifting customs tariffs, import quotas and other 
barriers (legal, technical and procedural) to trade. The agreement also 
stipulates that Kiev will liberalize regulations on investments and ser-
vices. Secondly, by signing it, Ukraine would undertake to adopt and 
implement EU laws, norms and standards concerning all trade under 
the agreement.1 
 
If signed and ratified, the AA and DCFTA together would constitute 
the backbone of the EU–Ukraine relations for at least a decade. The 
DCFTA would provide Ukraine access to the market of 500 million 
consumers valued to 17.6 trillion USD, compared to the domestic 
Ukrainian market of 50 million consumers and a mere 165 billion 
USD. It would improve conditions for Ukrainian companies operating 
in the EU, through a common legislative, technical and procedural 
framework for trade and investment and solution of trade disputes. In 
                                                 
* This chapter, an extended version of the 2012 seminar presentation, is based on materials 
published by the OSW (http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/tagi/Ukraine). 
1  Cf. R. Sadowski, ‘The prospects for the EU–Ukraine free trade agreement’, OSW Com-
mentary No 94, October 2012. 
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the long-term perspective, this would also facilitate the dialogue on 
visa liberalization and access to the EU labour and educational market 
for ordinary Ukrainian citizens.  
 
That is not to say that the process would be an easy and a smooth one, 
or that there are no pitfalls. The arrangement does not imply fully-
fledged Ukrainian membership in the EU at the end of the process, as 
this is always a political decision and depends on the overall integra-
tion context. It would, however, test Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-
pean integration, and the EU’s readiness to offer accession to those 
that meet membership requirements. Importantly, this has been the 
only concrete and realistic foundation for Ukraine’s integration with 
Europe: rather, there is no other and there will not be any other pro-
posal of this kind.   
 
Given this comprehensive arrangement, pessimism would seem out of 
place. However, pessimism emerges from the fact that despite the suc-
cess of the AA and DCFTA negotiations, the political dialogue be-
tween the EU and Ukraine has stalled to the extent that it may hamper 
final ratification of both documents and freeze EU–Ukraine coopera-
tion for years to come. Whether the agreements will be signed and 
implemented is still an open question, and depends on favourable po-
litical conditions. On the one hand, the repression imposed by the  
Kiev government on its political opponents (including the disputed 
conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko) has pro-
voked criticism from the EU. The Union now refuses to sign if the 
government in Kiev continues to violate democratic principles by ap-
plying selective justice. On the other hand, Russia has become in-
creasingly active in its efforts to pull Ukraine into the integration pro-
jects that it has initiated – the Customs Union and the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Community. Moscow has effective instruments for exerting its 
will, not least the dependence of the Ukrainian economy on supplies 
of Russian oil and gas and on exports to the internal Russian market.  
 
The parliamentary elections of 28 October 2012 did not help to clarify 
the overall picture. The report prepared jointly by the OSCE/ODIHR, 
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Par-
liamentary Assembly contains a positive evaluation of the events on 
election day, but the period preceding it and the counting of the votes 
in the electoral commissions were criticized.2 The report’s main points 
of criticism against the government were an unfair and biased elec-
toral campaign, primarily the failure to ensure equal opportunities for 
all candidates; the excessive use of administrative resources to pro-
                                                 
2   Post-election interim report 29 October–6 November 2012, published  9 November 2012, 
at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/97077 
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mote the government’s own candidates; the lack of pluralism in the 
media; the jailing of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko, prevent-
ing them from participating in the elections; and the non-transparent 
counting process. The report did not contain any direct suggestions 
that these elections should be acknowledged as free and fair, or any 
assessment concerning the impact of the irregularities on the final 
electoral result. In general, these elections have been described as a 
step backward in comparison to those held in 2007.3 
 
The conclusions contained in reports from other institutions are large-
ly similar to those of the OSCE. The International Civil Society’s 
Election Observation Mission to Ukraine reported procedural irregu-
larities, but said that ‘the incidents did not appear to have a nature and 
a scope that could have seriously distorted the election results.’4 In 
turn, the report from the well-reputed Ukrainian organization, the 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine, deemed that, despite numerous ir-
regularities in the period preceding Election Day, ‘they were not of a 
mass scale and systematic nature’.5 The head of the ENEMO mission 
stated that the elections showed a regression in respect of democratic 
standards, in comparison to those in 2007, and cited various forms of 
abuse of power from the government as the most serious violations.6 
 
On the other hand, however, as Andrew Wilson of ECFR noted, there 
were encouraging signs of democratic vitality.7 The political competi-
tion was real, although curtailed by unequal access to mass media and 
the tricks of political technologists. The opposition parties (United 
Opposition, Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms and Freedom 
Party) gathered more votes in the proportional elections than the rul-
ing Party of Regions. The number of parties represented in the 
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) promises more political debates than 
fewer, and more importantly, it shows that Ukrainian voters are not 
afraid to vote against the government. The total vote for the opposition 
parties (United Opposition Batkivshchyna [Fatherland], UDAR [Blow] 
and Svoboda [Freedom]) in the proportional elections was higher than 
that for the ruling party, which won 30 per cent compared to the oppo-
sition’s 49.9 per cent. The Party of Regions won in single-mandate 
                                                 
3  Cf. T. Olszanski, ‘After the parliamentary elections in Ukraine: a tough victory for the 
Party of Regions’, OSW Eastweek, 07.11.2012. 
4  Preliminary statement on findings and conclusions international civil society election 
observation mission to Ukraine Kiev, 29 October 2012, 
http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/obser
vation-mission-to-ukraine-2012-preliminary-statement.pdf 
5    Ibid. 
6  See Kiev Post, 28 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/enemo-mission-points-to-irregularities-in-
ukraines-elections-315144.html  
7  A. Wilson, ‘The EU and Ukraine after the 2012 elections’, ECFR policy memo, Novem-
ber 2012. 
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constituencies,8 but even here, it did not enjoy the success it had ex-
pected. Compared with the 2007 election, it lost nearly 2 million vot-
ers (see Table 1); and the 187 to 189 seats it can count on do not give 
it a simple majority (which would require 226 votes). 
 
Indeed, the elections clearly show that Ukraine’s political system is 
far from being consolidated in an authoritarian fashion, and that the 
government has to accept the reality of political pluralism and compe-
tition. In this, Ukraine stands out from Belarus or Russia, where the 
genuine opposition groupings are not allowed to take part in any elec-
tions, and thus are driven onto the streets. On the other hand, Ukraine 
may be sliding from democracy to some soft version of authoritarian-
ism, and notable problems persist. 
 
 The freedom and independence of the mass media are still se-
cure by post-Soviet standards, but do not live up to European 
norms. The freedom and independence of the media in 
Ukraine have been regularly restricted over the past three 
years. Following a period of relative freedom in 2005–2010, 
the scope of direct and indirect government control of the 
press has increased. The press in Ukraine has partially lost its 
position as a watchdog regarding the government and politi-
cians in general, and cannot act as a reliable source of infor-
mation to the public.9 
 Selective justice which aims at side-lining political rivals 
brings Ukraine closer to Russia and Belarus, but not to its 
western neighbours like Poland. The Tymoshenko verdict has 
accentuated this problem. 
 Endemic corruption and lack of an independent and effective 
judiciary system and police make small and medium-sized en-
terprises, both Ukrainian and foreign ones, helpless in defend-
ing their property rights and businesses. 
 Finally, Ukraine is sliding towards an authoritarian consolida-
tion of state power under President Viktor Yanukovych. The 
problem lies not so much in the fact of the presidential system 
of power, a systemic feature of most post-Soviet states, but in 
the policy of Yanukovych (and his ‘Family’) of taking over 
control of the institutions of the state and its major economic 
assets.  
Given the deteriorating state of Ukrainian democracy, it matters less 
that the EU accepts the elections result as meeting basic democratic 
standards. The major question remains whether the EU will sign and 
                                                 
8  The elections were held under a mixed system: 225 seats allotted in proportion to national 
lists, and 225 chosen in single-mandate constituencies. 
9  Cf. T. Iwanski, ‘The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elec-
tions’, OSW Commentary, September 2012. 
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ratify the AA and DCFTA – and the outcome here will send a political 
message to Kiev. Continuing cooperation on the basis of the AA 
might be interpreted by the Ukrainian authorities as not only full ac-
ceptance of their policies, but also a reward for ‘good performance’. 
By contrast, suspending the political dialogue and postponing the AA 
and DCFTA ad calendas graecas might result in less leverage on  
Kiev and – in the longer term – acceptance of Ukraine’s drift towards 
a fully-fledged authoritarian state. The choices confronting the EU in 
its Ukrainian policy must be thoroughly scrutinized before any deci-
sions are taken. 
 
In the present situation, a myopic domestic political agenda has side-
lined the long-term state interests of Ukraine. From the early days of 
the Tymoshenko trial in June 2011, EU leaders sent an unequivocal 
message to Yanukovych: they did not regard the proceedings as fair, 
and her imprisonment would put at risk the signing of the AA and 
DCFTA.10 The trials revealed that Tymoshenko was charged with 
abuse of powers as Ukraine's acting prime minister at the end of 2008 
because she had issued instructions to officials negotiating the gas 
contract with Gazprom that were in violation of the relevant law. This 
in turn, according to the Criminal Code, resulted in ‘particularly size-
able’ losses. The link between the formal (procedural) mistakes with 
the content of the contract as it was eventually signed remains unclear, 
and the trial, to judge from the available materials, was unable to 
prove that Tymoshenko had in fact broken the law. This indicates that 
the trial was political in nature, intended to show that, in accepting 
unfavourable terms for the deliveries and transit of natural gas to 
Ukraine for the period from 2009 to 2019, Yulia Tymoshenko had 
acted to the detriment of state security. However, that allegation has 
not formally been made.11 
 
For months, Ukrainian authorities appeared to understand what the 
direct consequences of the trial would be, and promised to find a legal 
solution that would solve the problem, by introducing new clauses in 
the Penalty Code that would distinguish between the abuse of the ad-
ministrative power and criminal acts. But in October 2011, Tymo-
shenko was convicted and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In 
addition, the court ruled that she was barred from holding public of-
fice for three years, and was obliged to pay damages to Naftogaz 
amounting to 1.5 billion hryvna (approximately USD 187 million).  
 
                                                 
10  A. Kwiatkowska, A. Ciechnowicz, T. Iwanski and R. Sadowski, ‘The crisis in 
EU/Ukraine relations surrounding Tymoshenko’, OSW Eastweek, May 2012. 
11  S. Matuszak and T. Olszanski, ‘Yulia Tymoshenko sentenced’, OSW Eastweek, October 
2012, available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-10-12/yulia-
tymoshenko-sentenced.  
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The sentence sparked immediate and sharp criticism from Brussels as 
well as from individual EU countries. European politicians saw the 
court's decision as politically motivated and a violation of all demo-
cratic standards. The head of EU diplomacy, Catherine Ashton, stated 
the verdict would affect bilateral EU–Ukraine relations, including the 
Association Agreement.12 At the same time, the Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Stefan Füle, indicated that he was counting on Tymo-
shenko’s rapid release through changes to Ukraine’s Criminal Code.13 
 
The escalating criticism of the Ukrainian government has led to the 
political isolation of President Yanukovych and his government. The 
summit of Central European states scheduled for May 2012 in Yalta 
was cancelled, as 14 of the 19 presidents refused to participate; more-
over, a host of European leaders announced their boycott of the 
Ukrainian part of European Soccer Championship games in 2012. 
These symbolic gestures confirm Ukraine’s decreasing importance in 
the policy of European countries, which are no longer interested in 
improving dialogue with the government in Kiev.  
 
Yanukovych’s political tactics of having his cake and eating it too – 
sentencing Tymoshenko for her alleged crime without jeopardizing 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU – has proven self-defeating. It reflects 
a constant problem faced by Ukrainian policymakers: that of being 
overconfident in one’s power and overestimating the importance of 
one’s position. Indeed, we could say that Ukraine is now getting what 
it deserves: the politicization of the judiciary system and the abuse of 
administrative resources in violation of the rules of the democratic 
game must lead to a halt in the process of EU integration. The EU has 
no other option but to be consistent in its policies – otherwise it will 
undermine its own position not only towards Ukraine, but also the en-
tire set of standards it seeks to bring to the EU neighbourhood. 
 
Clearly, however, this game has one important flaw. By focusing on 
the Ukrainian authorities, and on Yanukovych himself as the main in-
stigator of the strategy, it reduces the EU–Ukraine relationship to a 
dialogue between political elites, leaving no room for society at large. 
This does not mean that Ukrainians do not share the EU criticism. On 
the contrary, an independent mass media, an efficient and independent 
judiciary and democratic rules of the political game are the bedrock of 
a modern and free society. Ukrainian society and public opinion are as 
disappointed with the current state of affairs as is the EU, and see the 
EU as a potential instigator of change and improvement.  
 
                                                 
12 Ashton was first quoted that the AA should proceed. For Ashton’s statements, see: 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20111013/167634985.html and 
http://commonspace.eu/eng/links/6/id923. [Editor’s comment]  
13  S. Matuszak and T. Olszanski, op. cit. 
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After more than three years under President Viktor Yanukovych and 
the Party of Regions, Ukrainian society has little confidence in the 
state, its main institutions and its politicians, regardless of their politi-
cal affiliation.14 Polls taken after two and a half years with Yanu-
kovych show that none of the key state institutions, with the exception 
of the army, is trusted by more than 22 per cent of the Ukrainian peo-
ple. Although President Viktor Yanukovych enjoys the highest public 
confidence levels among all politicians in the ruling camp, only 22 per 
cent of the respondents say that they trust the president; while as many 
as 66% do not trust him. Yanukovych performs badly even in the 
eastern parts of the country, where both he and his Party of Regions 
have traditionally enjoyed the highest level of public confidence: only 
30 per cent of the respondents in eastern Ukraine say they trust the 
president, while as many as 57 per cent do not. Public support for the 
decisions taken by Yanukovych during his presidency has also been 
waning. Back in April 2010 – two months after Yanukovych took of-
fice – 37 per cent of the Ukrainians supported his policies; by Decem-
ber 2011 this figure had dropped to just 8 per cent. A similar decrease 
over the same period was observed in the public’s support for both the 
government and parliament.15 
 
Ukrainian society has become increasingly alienated from political 
life.16 As many as 82 per cent of Ukrainians believe that they have no 
real influence over what happens in the country, while over half of the 
respondents are uninterested in or irritated by the work of the govern-
ment and the president. The polls also show that only 5 per cent of 
respondents respect those who hold power, and as little as 3 per cent 
are positively disposed towards the members of the ruling camp. Fur-
thermore, the number of people who consider themselves to be happy 
has dropped for the first time in 10 years and for the first time under 
the rule of Viktor Yanukovych; the figure for 2012 stood at 53 per 
cent (down from 63 per cent for 2010). 
 
On the other hand, the negative assessment of the work of the ruling 
party has not improved most Ukrainians’ view of the opposition. Also 
this side of the political spectrum suffers from low levels of public 
trust, although the figures are slightly better than those for the presi-
dent and the government. Polls suggest that 24 per cent of the elec-
torate trusts the opposition (while 53 per cent do not), with somewhat 
more positive figures coming from western Ukraine (a difference of 5 
per cent).17 Overall support for opposition leaders has been growing, 
                                                 
14  See Kiev International Institute of Sociology, February 2012. 
http://kiis.com.ua/ua/news/view-152.html 
15  Cf. T. Iwanski, ‘Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election’, OSW 
Commentary, No 89. 
16  See http://kiis.com.ua/ua/news/view-149.html 
17  T. Iwanski, op. cit. 
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albeit slowly. For example, between April 2010 and December 2011, 
public support for Yulia Tymoshenko increased from 14 per cent to 15 
per cent (and support for one of the key opposition figures, Arseny 
Yatsenyuk, rose from 11 per cent to 13 per cent in the same period). 
The high level of distrust of Ukrainian politicians can be clearly seen 
from a survey published by the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli indicating that 
Ukrainians are more likely to trust a complete stranger than a politi-
cian.18 Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is most willing to trust institu-
tions that have no links to the government, and those with no direct 
influence over the economic situation in the country. These include 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the media. These institutions are 
also the only ones that more people trust (62 per cent and 40 per cent, 
respectively) then distrust (17 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively).19 
 
The question hence arises: how not to reward (or even punish) Yanu-
kovych, without alienating a society that still regards the EU as a po-
tential instigator for change in Ukraine. And the tools for change are 
the AA and DCFTA – as they are not designed to perpetuate the rule 
of Yanukovych, or to improve business environment for the oligarchs, 
but to force Yanukovych and the oligarchs to create room for and pro-
tect small and medium-sized enterprises, to improve the investment 
climate for foreign companies and open up the Ukrainian economy for 
Europe. If the EU suspends the signing and ratification process of the 
AA and DCFTA, this will not necessarily undermine the power of 
Yanukovych, let alone force him to change his approach to Ukraine as 
‘a family business’. It may, however, punish society, as the deteriora-
tion of relations between Ukraine and the EU will have negative ef-
fects on other areas of cooperation, including visa liberalization, 
where a political decision by the EU countries is pending, even though 
the technical decisions have been made. 
 
A breakdown of relations with Ukraine will limit the importance of 
the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) as instruments in the EU’s foreign and security policy. With re-
lations with Belarus frozen, and progress in reforms in Moldova and 
in the countries of the Caucasus meagre and slow, EU involvement in 
the region will fade. The principle of ‘more for more’ announced in 
the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011 (more resources and 
preferential benefits from the EU in return for more progress in inte-
gration and reforms from EaP countries) may lead to a de facto reduc-
tion in EU funding for the eastern partners. Moreover, the eastern 
neighbourhood of the EU has also become less important in the face 
of mounting internal problems (like the Eurozone crisis, and changes 
in EU decisionmaking processes). Simultaneously, the marginalization 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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of Ukraine and other eastern neighbourhood countries vis-à-vis EU 
policy has weakened their bargaining positions with Russia, which 
might lead to a rise in Russian pressure in the region. 
 
Today, Ukraine finds itself sandwiched between two geopolitical pro-
jects: the European integration project, and the Russian Customs Un-
ion and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAzEc) initiatives. 
Despite all the flaws and question marks related to both projects, non-
commitment to either of them will in the short-term perspective (say, 
till 2015, the year of new presidential elections), pose serious political 
and economic challenges. The fence-sitting style of Ukraine’s foreign 
policy may still be viewed by many in Kiev as a sign of a strategic 
maturity and cleverness, but in reality it is a waste of time and a recipe 
for political and economic disaster. If Ukraine is not ready to make a 
choice, its policy will simply become a function of the choices made 
by Russia or the EU.  
 
The EU still has a role to play. It should embrace a dual-track strategy 
of alienating Yanukovych, while not losing sight of ordinary Ukraini-
ans. That will mean continuing a ‘tough-love’ policy by making 
Yanukovych’s life a bit harder, while refocusing on Ukrainian society. 
The question remains, however: is the EU prepared to play that role?  
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Table 1. 
Votes for main parties after 2007 and 2012 elections, in thou-
sands20 
Total vote  2007  2012  
Party of Regions 8013 6114 
Batkivshchyna 7162 5203 
Our Ukraine/People’s Self-Defence 
(2012: Our Ukraine) 
3301 226 
UDAR (did not partic-
ipate) 
2844 
Communist Party of Ukraine 1257 2686 
Lytvyn Bloc 924 (did not partic-
ipate) 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 668 93 
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine 309 (did not partic-
ipate) 
Svoboda 179 2127 
 
  
 
                                                 
20  T. Olszanski, ‘After the parliamentary elections in Ukraine’. 
Ukraine and Europe:  
Ukraine’s Civilizational Choice 
Grigoriy Perepelytsia 
 
 
 
Having obtained its independence as a state, Ukraine faces a whole set 
of problems in defining its future as a sovereign state. The major ones 
are the problem of civilizational choice, the formation of the political 
system and the Ukrainian nation, the building of state institutions, and 
finally, the strategies and principles of its foreign and security policy. 
Ukraine's path to the EU faces a host of obstacles, and these again are 
linked to both internal and external factors. 
Five Obstacles – Five realities 
The first factor concerns the geopolitical position of Ukraine. Its terri-
tory is on the fringes of two civilizations: the Eastern Eurasian (Rus-
sian) and the Western European. Modern Ukraine has found itself 
playing the role of a shared periphery. The eastern and south-eastern 
parts of the country are historically and politically focused on Russia, 
while the western and central parts look to Europe. 
 
From this position, Ukraine has limited capacities to implement its 
foreign policy interests, as these capacities depend primarily on the 
quality of relations between the West and the East. Any East/West 
clash of interests always turns Ukraine into a buffer zone and a medial 
state. According to the classical geopolitical definition by Collins,1 
such buffer states can lose their sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Ukraine occupies precisely such a geopolitical position, as a medial 
state and a buffer zone. 
 
In the post-Communist transformation processes, Ukraine, like the 
other former East Bloc countries, faced the challenges of dismantling 
the Communist political system. All these countries basically rejected 
the its ideology and embarked on a transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy by building a free market economy on the ruins of the old 
planned economy. Over a period of some twenty years, the former 
                                                 
1  Randall Collins, ‘Geopolitics in an Era of Internationalism’, Social Evolution and History, 
vol. 1, no. 1, 2002, available at:  http://www.socionauki.ru/journal/articles/130385/  
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Communist system countries have gone through these changes – but 
their paths, and the depth and results, show fundamental differences.  
 
The Central European countries have always been part of political and 
geopolitical Europe. Nobody has doubted that they belong to Europe-
an civilization, the European cultural community and to European his-
tory. That these countries came to be within the Communist camp was 
a result of Soviet occupation following the establishment of the Yalta-
Potsdam system in Europe. The destruction of this system at the end 
of the Cold War has, quite naturally, put the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Central Europe and the return of these countries to the rest 
of Europe through accession to NATO and the EU on the political 
agenda of Europe. 
 
Due to its geographical location, Ukraine has been part of Europe. But 
it could not be considered part of political Europe and, more specifi-
cally, not part of the wider European civilization because it was part 
of the USSR. The criteria employed by the West in determining the 
fate of Central Europe could not be applied to Ukraine. It was not seen 
as having been occupied by Soviet troops and could not expect to be 
included into the European and Euro-Atlantic community 
 
From this it follows that, if the dominant influence on internal proces-
ses and foreign policy of the Baltic States and Central Europe after the 
Cold War had the EU, NATO and the USA as a source, the former 
Soviet states were externally influenced by Russia. If the Western in-
fluence focused on democratic transformation and economic reforms 
in the Baltic States and Central Europe, the influence of the Russian 
factor in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, served rather to re-
verse such processes. So the first obstacle which greatly complicates 
the movement of Ukraine to Europe is its status as a divided periphery. 
 
Another structuring difference is the process of nation building in 
Central Europe, in Ukraine and in other countries of the post-Soviet 
space. Historically, these processes were associated with the post-
imperial and post-colonial transition following the collapse of the Ot-
toman Empire in the 19th century and the Austrian Empire after the 
First World War. These collapses offered extensive opportunities for 
the formation of nations in the Central and Eastern European areas 
that had been part of these empires. Even before the Second World 
War, the peoples of these countries had already emerged as fully-
fledged European nations, with their own national elites and indeed 
their own independent national states. 
 
Ukraine, which by and large was a part of the Russian Empire, as well 
as other national borderlands of Russia, did not have such opportuni-
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ties. Connected to the Communist camp, the Central European coun-
tries retained their state identity, although their sovereignty was lim-
ited by the Soviet Union. The Communist elites of these countries had 
a clear national identity, and their ruling Communist parties demon-
strated a national-Communist disposition, although they professed the 
principles of internationalism. 
 
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) also praised the 
principle of internationalism in its domestic and foreign policy, but in 
reality, its efforts were directed against any national manifestations. 
Therefore, the Communist Party of Ukraine conducted an overall anti-
national policy by trying to turn Ukraine into a social community 
based on Soviet Russian identity.  Thus we see that the second obsta-
cle was that Ukraine, unlike Central Europe, simultaneously faced 
four historic tasks: to create an independent state, to form a Ukrainian 
nation, to conduct free-market economic reforms, and to establish a 
democratic political regime. 
 
The third obstacle hindering Ukraine is that its European integration 
policy has had an instrumental rather than an axiological character. 
Integration into the European community has been seen mostly as a 
matter of political tactics preserving the interests of certain groups in 
the ruling elite: policies do not reflect the core interests of the state 
and society. 
 
In short, the basis of European transformation processes in Central 
Europe was rooted in European democratic values. By contrast, in 
Ukraine, obtaining state sovereignty was based not on European val-
ues, but on a combination of paternalistic attitudes in society as well 
as nomenklatura interests. At the 1991 referendum, the people of 
Ukraine cast their votes for independence on the basis of material 
needs and paternalistic motives, hoping to improve their living stand-
ards and well-being while living in an independent state. 
 
Democracy, the slogans of which have been employed in Ukraine by 
all political parties (including the Communist Party), is widely per-
ceived solely as a tool for improving the welfare of ordinary citizens. 
And Ukraine’s European choice is supported by the population, in the 
expectation that financial aid from the EU will improve the overall 
economic situation in the country. 
 
The dominance of social populism and paternalism in Ukrainian so-
ciety complicates the formation of a democratic regime and creates 
highly favourable conditions for the reproduction of authoritarianism. 
Such a paternalistic approach generates aspirations among those living 
in the eastern and southeastern regions of bringing the country back to 
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the influence of Russia, in hopes of getting cheap gas and thereby im-
proving their living standards. The same paternalistic approach is 
largely determined by the negative attitude among Ukrainian society 
to NATO membership, which does not promise any specific material 
goods. 
 
This does not mean that over time these values will not be important 
for the formation of the political views of Ukrainians. After all, the 
Orange Revolution in 2004 unfolded under the slogans of democratic 
values, not under those of social populism. But the lack of consensus 
among democratic elites leads to a lack of consolidated democracy, 
resulting in a return to authoritarianism. If the democratic transfor-
mation in Ukraine has been associated with the establishment of polit-
ical power institutions and has been instrumental in nature, Central 
European transformations were based on European democratic values. 
 
This instrumental nature of democratic changes was necessary, first of 
all, for the Communist nomenklatura itself, which under the failure of 
the Communist system privatized economic, natural resources as well 
as political power in the country. State sovereignty and nation-
building were not objectives pursued by the Ukrainian party nomen-
klatura: they saw state sovereignty as a tool for attaining power and 
control over the economic resources located on its territory, regardless 
of the union government in Moscow. 
 
Therefore, if the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries could be considered as democratic revolutions, 
Ukraine experienced a nomenklatura revolution in 1991. The former 
Communist elite that consolidated its power to develop the Ukrainian 
state and consolidate the nation, and it failed in the formation of a 
consolidated democracy. Its main task was, and remains, control over 
economic resources and the government institutions in the country. 
 
Symptomatically, it was this process that led the Ukrainian elite to 
adopt ‘Stay Away from Russia’ as its major foreign policy slogan in 
the 1990s. In its concentrated form, this slogan encapsulates the con-
tent of President Leonid Kuchma’s book Ukraine is not Russia. By 
contrast, for most Central and Eastern European countries the main 
slogan of transformational changes was to ‘Return to Europe’. So the 
fourth obstacle along Ukraine’s path toward Europe is that for the 
Ukrainians ruling elite, a ‘return to Europe’ was not on the agenda; 
and the opportunities and challenges which thus needed to be addres-
sed were not deemed politically relevant. Government and society in 
Ukraine did not see the Soviet troops as ‘occupying forces’: Ukraine 
simply nationalized them. This may explain why the elite prolonged 
the Russian military presence on Ukrainian territory first for 20 years 
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and then for another 25 years until 2042 in Sevastopol (the Black Sea 
Fleet in Ukraine), thereby increasing the country’s dependence on 
Russia. 
 
What about the Western model of society? In my view, this model 
was generally unacceptable to the ruling Ukrainian government for 
economic and political reasons. Paradoxically then, Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration has not only become an important aspect of transformational 
changes in Ukraine: it has actually split society into supporters and 
opponents. The Party of Regions, the Communist Party and other pro-
Russian forces launched a massive anti-NATO campaign in Ukraine, 
seeking to mobilize their electorate in the eastern and southeastern re-
gions of the country in their struggle for political power in local, par-
liamentary and presidential elections.2 Subsequently, a policy of a re-
turn to Europe through reducing Russian influence, upholding national 
sovereignty, democracy and prosperity failed to become a significant 
motivation to accelerate the transformation processes for both govern-
ment and society in Ukraine, compared with the countries of Central 
Europe.3 
 
Thus, for 20 years, Ukraine has failed to overcome the main problems 
and resolve the main tasks of the transitional period. State leaders 
have lacked political will and foresight to implement radical economic 
reforms, and this has led to an environment conducive to the reproduc-
tion of authoritarian rule. To invoke the parallel with Third World 
countries: overcoming neo-colonialism could be considered a main 
driver for a transformation process towards the formation of a Ukrain-
ian nation, i.e. a united and strong Ukrainian state aiming for Europe-
an integration. However, the paradox is that Ukrainians do not see 
themselves as a ‘colonized’ nation. Moreover, many of those living in 
the eastern and southeastern regions of the country see themselves as 
part of a ‘Russian world’, and identify not with European, but with 
Russian or Eurasian civilization. 
 
Thus, the fifth obstacle for Ukraine's integration into Europe is its in-
complete post-colonial transition, where one part of country identifies 
itself not with European, but with the Russian or Eurasian civilization 
and culture. 
                                                 
2  As mentioned by James Sherr in this volume, Yanukovych declared in 2006, after having 
become Prime Minister, that Ukraine wanted a ‘pause’ in the relationship. The exact 
words were that ‘Ukraine was not ready for MAP’. [Editor’s comment.]  
3  Here Ukraine should be compared not with Central Europe, but rather with the Third 
World countries currently experiencing post-colonial transition. For a long period of its 
history Ukraine was built into imperial-colonial models of the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union. Today, this model continues to dominate relations between Ukraine and 
Russia. It combines flaws of both neo-colonialism and imperialism, with Ukraine being 
considered by Russian society and its political class as a Russian colony and a Russian 
periphery at the same time. 
54 Grigoriy Perepelytsia 
Prospects for Ukraine's relations with Europe 
Given the aforementioned obstacles, Ukraine has tried to implement 
three models of relations with Europe: integration, disintegration and 
balancing between East and West. These strategies will be analysed in 
detail below.  
 
The integration model of Ukraine’s foreign policy was implemented 
in the period from 2004 to 2010. It was associated primarily with the 
intention of obtaining both EU and NATO membership. Euro-Atlantic 
and European integration were declared the main vectors of Ukraine’s 
foreign policy, and the ‘Orange Revolution’  provided an opportunity 
to implement these European aspirations for the first time since 
Ukraine had declared its independence. Following the example of 
their neighbours, a substantial part of the Ukrainian elite saw the 
chance to achieve two main strategic objectives simultaneously: to 
integrate into Europe economically, and in terms of security.  
 
This, however, unleashed a set of paradoxes: first, NATO membership 
remained the only way for Ukraine to integrate into Europe after the 
EU had decided to halt its enlargement process, at least temporarily. 
The paradox was reinforced by the fact that during this period, 
Ukraine faced a wide range of regional challenges that were almost 
impossible to resolve without NATO’s help. First of all, there was the 
challenge from Russia itself. Ukraine’s status as an independent sove-
reign state de facto contradicts Moscow’s vital geopolitical interests. 
On this backdrop, joining NATO would guarantee the strengthening 
of Ukraine’s sovereignty as well as preserving its independence and 
territorial integrity. However, mired in constant infighting and having 
lost credibility in society, the ‘orange’ government was not enthusias-
tic about full implementation of a Euro-Atlantic course. Moreover, 
opponents of the democratic forces were conducting a strong anti-
NATO information campaign, with the support of Russia. As a result, 
the integration model of Ukraine’s foreign policy, with its objective of 
joining the European and Euro-Atlantic community, became a lost op-
portunity. 
 
As for the balancing model, a classic example remains the foreign pol-
icy of President Kuchma in the first period of his presidency (1994–
1999). It became known as the multi-vector policy, and was condi-
tioned on the following fact: In the post-Cold War period, trends of 
convergence dominated over trends of confrontation in Europe. Russia 
was too weak to recover its geopolitical influence in Europe, but still 
strong enough to retain control over the post-Soviet space it had lost 
as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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While the West did not try to integrate Ukraine into the European 
community of nations, it also had no desire to restore the Russian geo-
political power that would bring back the Cold War period. Therefore, 
Europe, NATO and the USA were interested in preserving the inde-
pendence of Ukraine. For its part, Ukraine did not seek real integra-
tion into Europe (NATO or EU membership). Ukraine’s ruling elite 
were sceptical to NATO membership and security guarantees, in addi-
tion to professing values too different from the official EU values. Lo-
cated between these geopolitical powers, Kiev used its position as a 
bargaining tool, seeking rapprochement with and support from Europe 
and the USA, while cultivating good relations with Russia. This policy 
of counter-balancing was not an integration process, but rather a 
means for avoiding integration with any system in the axis of Europe–
Russia relations. Moreover, this policy gave the elite time to consoli-
date the Ukrainian state and the political regime in the country without 
external interference.  
 
However, during Kuchma’s second presidency in 2001–2004, this 
strategy fell apart. Authoritarian tendencies began to dominate in 
Ukraine, and the establishment of the authoritarian regime of Vladimir 
Putin in Russia also rendered such a balancing policy ineffective. 
Moreover, Viktor Yanukovych’s attempts at employing Kuchma’s 
policy of balancing between the West and Russia in 2010 took place 
under fundamentally different geopolitical, external and internal polit-
ical conditions, and had little chance of success. Instead, it provoked 
the development of a new foreign policy strategy, which can be 
termed double asymmetric integration: a situation where a country is 
integrated simultaneously into two opposing directions and two antag-
onistic systems.  
 
At first glance, this model might seem preferable, since it removes the 
internal contradictions between the eastern and western regions of 
Ukraine with their differing geopolitical orientations. It also dampens 
tensions in relations with Russia connected to Ukraine’s integration 
into the European community of nations (NATO and the EU), and the 
other way around: Ukraine’s relations with the West, if the country 
should decide to integrate into Russia. However, this should be con-
sidered as a dangerous experiment, as it may result in the break-up of 
Ukraine into (at least) two parts, one integrated into Russia, the other 
into Europe. And yet, this is the very model that the current Ukrainian 
government under President Viktor Yanukovych has been trying to 
implement. Let us take a closer look at its components.  
 
The basic principles of this model are as follows. First comes the con-
struction of a ‘new country’ on the basis of the restoration of Soviet 
Russian identity. In Yanukovych’s perception, such an identity would 
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provide the same support for his power as, in the case of Putin and 
Medvedev, imperial thinking does for Russians. Secondly, there is the 
modernization of a ‘new country’ with an authoritarian political sys-
tem. The social and political basis of authoritarianism in Ukraine con-
sists of the corporate interests of big business as well as the state bu-
reaucracy, none of which are interested in the development of a free 
market economy. Corporatism in this form monopolizes the Ukrainian 
market and sustains authoritarianism in politics. The construction of 
such an authoritarian power model – the ‘vertical of power’ – in 
Ukraine will direct the country’s foreign policy course towards inte-
gration with Russia and something similar to Putin’s system of ‘man-
aged democracy’. The third principle entails ensuring an influx of 
Western technologies and investments – in other words, excluding the 
possibility of Ukraine being isolated by the West. The goal of this 
double asymmetrical integration into Europe and Russia is to leverage 
different vectors of Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation.  
 
Implementation of the concept of double asymmetrical integration in 
relations with Russia has some specific features, or guiding principles.  
 
1. Replacing the principle of national interests with pragmatism. Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Konstantin Gryshchenko,4 has given the fol-
lowing interpretation for a pragmatic approach in the foreign policy of 
Ukraine: ‘It springs to mind that pragmatism is a strategy based on 
result-oriented tactical behaviour, and a result is something which 
should be achievable not in a distant, but in a foreseeable future.’5 
Therefore, pragmatism reduces foreign policy from being a process of 
forecasting, strategic planning, approval and implementation to be-
come a certain behaviour, oriented not towards long-term strategic 
perspective but towards certain short-term ‘results’. Applied to 
Ukraine’s integration into the EU, this would mean not integration on 
the basis of common values, but to achieve agreements on a visa-free 
regime, an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), all the while disregarding the 
value dimension.  
 
Under this pragmatic approach, priorities regarding national interests 
can also be changed or omitted at the expense of other more funda-
mental interests – i.e. the pursuit of economic interests at the expense 
of national security and issues of state sovereignty. This makes pos-
sible significant concessions in the field of national security. Indeed, 
trading off sovereignty for economic preferences is not excluded with-
                                                 
4  Gryshchenko was foreign minister until he was replaced by Leonid Kozhara in January 
2013. [Editor’s comment] 
5  Konstantyn Gryshchenko, ‘Ukraine as the General European Factor’, Zerkalo Nedeli 14 
January 2011.  
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in this approach – and that leads us to the second principle of double 
asymmetrical integration: 
 
2. Removing ideology from the foreign policy of Ukraine. Double 
asymmetrical integration into a democratic Europe and into an author-
itarian Russia is not possible without this principle. But its conse-
quences reach deeper. Indeed, it leads to: 
 
3. De-nationalizing the foreign policy of Ukraine. Aimed at aligning 
Ukraine’s interests with those of Russia, it involves surrendering the 
shaping of the entire humanitarian sphere to Russia, thereby sacrific-
ing the protection of Ukrainian national values, interests and identity 
in relations with Russia. This means that important policy dimensions 
like the protection of Ukraine from Russian information and cultural 
expansion, the barring of Russia from interference in Ukraine’s inter-
nal affairs, and the protection of the Ukrainian language as well as the 
rights of Ukrainian citizens – all disappear completely from the set of 
foreign policy priorities. Having de-nationalized its foreign policy, 
Ukraine expects to get economic preferences from Russia in ex-
change.  
 
The result of these changes is obvious: Ukraine has lost sovereignty 
and the ability to formulate a foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia. With the 
implementation of a double asymmetrical integration, Ukraine faces 
one big problem: the attempt to move simultaneously in two opposite 
directions cannot compensate for the negative consequences of asym-
metry. In the best scenario, the state can reduce the consequences; but 
under the worst scenario, the double move may enhance the risk that 
the more powerful subject in this asymmetry will gain the upper hand. 
 
This trend has been evident in the years since this model was imple-
mented. The officially declared aims of the foreign policy are formu-
lated to suit both Ukraine’s integration into the European political, 
economic and legal space (in order to achieve EU membership), as 
well as a harmonization of relations with Russia to the extent that a 
strategic partnership should be formed. As the results of this period 
show, Ukraine has achieved neither of these. The reasons for this fail-
ure lie primarily in the contradictions between European integration 
objectives and the goals of reintegration into the Russian political-
economic and humanitarian space on the one hand, as well as the 
brewing contradictions between the objectives of Ukraine’s foreign 
and domestic policies on the other. The objectives pursued by Ukraine 
along the Russian vector are in grave contradiction with the objectives 
of European integration, whereas the transition towards Europe im-
plies a challenge to the Russian reintegration project.  
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In sum, Ukraine’s movement towards one side has provoked a conflict 
with the other party. The principle of double asymmetric integration 
declared by Kiev can mean only one thing: stagnation caused by un-
certainty about the country’s orientation, and subsequent creeping in-
ternational isolation. To the extent that Ukraine continues with this 
situation of uncertainty, the country will be isolated by both sides of 
the conflict. Reintegration into Russia under the banner of resurgent 
authoritarianism will isolate Ukraine further from the West. Indeed, it 
is clear that Russia seeks to isolate Ukraine from the West – because if 
Ukraine joined the European community, that would eliminate any 
prospects of reintegrating the country into Russia. Indeed, the creation 
of a DCFTA with the EU significantly weakens the political influence 
and economic presence of Russia in Ukraine. Moreover, the rules of 
this zone will prevent the absorption of the Ukrainian economy by 
Russia and make Russian capital less competitive in the Ukrainian 
market.  
 
On the other hand, Russia would be satisfied with the reintegration of 
Ukraine into a pro-Russian union along the lines of the Customs Un-
ion or the Eurasian Union. Ukraine’s unwillingness to join the Cus-
toms Union has already entailed certain actions from the Kremlin, 
aimed at isolating Ukraine from the Russian market as well as the 
market of the members of the Customs Union.6  
 
Finally, fluctuations in Ukraine’s policies only reinforce EU doubts 
about the sincerity of Kiev’s European aspirations. EU politicians 
view membership in the Eurasian Common Economic Space as in-
compatible with admission to a free trade area with the EU. This situa-
tion creates new reintegration ambitions in Moscow, giving it the op-
portunity to use not only sticks but also carrots to encourage Ukraine 
to accept reintegration. To this end, Russia has promised to reduce the 
price of Russian gas if Ukraine joins the Customs Union. Then, as 
Putin holds, the Customs Union will negotiate a Free Trade Area with 
the EU, but from a much stronger position.7 In such a situation, the 
negotiations with the EU would be conducted by Russia – not 
Ukraine. It is obvious that Ukraine’s EU integration through Moscow 
would also involves a scheme whereby Ukraine’s reintegration with 
Russia will prevent any future western orientation on the part of 
Ukraine, which will lose its sovereignty by being a member of these 
Russian-dominated associations.  
                                                 
6  Indications of this came with the so-called ‘cheese war’, where Ukraine accused Moscow 
that the blocking the export of cheese to Russian markets (under reference to its high con-
tent of palm oil) was a tool for pulling Ukraine into the Customs Union. See Kiev Post, 13 
February 2012, available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukraine-russia-
trade-accusations-in-cheese-war-122352.html  (editor’s comment).  
7  Putin nameren otgovorit Yanukovicha ot blizosti s ES. Available at:  
http://www.utro.ua/ru/politika/putin_nameren_otgovorit_yanukovicha_ot_blizosti_s_es13
01895904. 
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The efforts of the current Ukrainian government to overcome the 
asymmetry of integration priorities in the Western and the Eastern di-
rections is an utter fiasco. The concessions made for the sake of the 
geopolitical interests of Russia have brought about the complete and 
final rejection of Ukraine’s European integration vector, the same sce-
nario employed by Moscow when it forced Kiev to bury its Euro-
Atlantic integration intentions. Upholding the EU integration course 
has also proven impossible under authoritarian modernization, as it 
runs roughshod over democratic values. 
 
This negative trend will have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine, 
weakening the positions of the current government: firstly, the gov-
ernment will lose the fight for equal relations with Russia; second, the 
asymmetric dependence on Moscow will increase significantly; third, 
it will block asymmetric integration of Ukraine in the European direc-
tion and, finally, it will be impossible to modernize the country in line 
with European standards. In this situation, the only way to modernize 
Ukraine becomes to reintegrate into Russia and its integration associa-
tions. 
 
Summing up Kiev’s achievements and failures in relations with Rus-
sia and the EU, we note that the Ukrainian authorities have tried to 
find a balance between the Russian and European directions, and to 
show that non-aligned status may be a way out for the country. Equal-
ly obvious, however, is that Ukrainian foreign policy has failed to up-
hold the balance between the internal aspirations of Yanukovych to 
maintain a monopoly on power in the country and progress in negotia-
tions with the EU on closer association. It seems inevitable that the 
‘equal proximity’ policy fiasco and the subsequent threat of interna-
tional isolation and increasing Russian pressure will force Kiev to lean 
towards the isolationist model in the West/East axis.  
 
An isolationist model will significantly reduce the impact of both the 
West and Russia on the political situation in Ukraine. The model fur-
thermore contributes to concentrating on the internal social and politi-
cal processes unfolding within the country, such as the integration of 
the eastern and western parts of Ukraine. In this case, isolationism is 
seen as a way of strengthening the unity of Ukraine. However, we 
should not forget that a policy of isolationism may prove productive 
only under conditions of a viable economy, such as a protected market 
and sufficient natural resources. In the absence of such conditions and 
the presence of internal power struggles, each political force will rely 
on foreign support. Isolationism cannot remove the ‘buffer-zone 
curse’ from Ukraine, nor can it prevent Russia from interfering in the 
internal affairs of Ukraine, even if the standard security orientation of 
the isolationist model is non-alignment. 
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Isolationist policies may be motivated by the political and economic 
interests of the leading political parties or the ruling elite. Here, 
Ukraine’s non-bloc status can be seen as associated with two groups 
of interests. The first group represents the interests of the regional oli-
garchic financial-industrial groups, which seek to preserve their own 
monopoly on the control of the economic resources of the country un-
der conditions of low competition with foreign investors. Political and 
economic isolationism contributes to upholding such a monopoly, 
whereas the European and Euro-Atlantic course breaks this monopoly. 
The second interest group has a predominantly political orientation. 
This group does not identify itself with Ukraine: it sees the country’s 
neutral status as justified not by national security interests, but by the 
interests of Russia. 
 
In any case, the isolationist model cannot solve the problem of 
Ukraine’s civilizational choice. This model represents a delayed and 
uncertain future for Ukraine, making it entirely dependent on the mar-
ket conditions and volatility of the international situation.  
Conclusions 
The problem of making a choice in its foreign policy still haunts 
Ukraine, as it has throughout its independence. The fiasco of the poli-
cy of ‘equal proximity’ or double asymmetric integration is pre-
determined by the incompatibility between the Western European and 
Russian political systems as well as the contradiction between the in-
ternal and external objectives of this policy. It seems highly probable 
that, after the failure of the policy of ‘equal proximity’, Ukrainian for-
eign policy will evolve towards isolationism.  
 
This is not due solely to external factors. The inability of Ukraine to 
solve the problem of its geopolitical choice between the West and the 
East is rooted in the combination of belonging to a shared periphery 
(defined by the current geopolitical situation), and the internal state of 
a ‘divided society’ caused by the Soviet heritage, as well as the in-
complete processes of formation of the Ukrainian nation and state-
hood. Ukraine faces the enormous challenges of de-Sovietization, de-
colonization, de-Russification, democratization, de-oligarchization, 
Europeanization – and the formation of a strong political opposition, 
capable of building consensus between elites, as well as developing a 
clear strategy for social changes. In Ukraine, de-Sovietization is in-
complete; moreover, the advent of the oligarchic-Communist coalition 
in 2010 promoted a restoration of elements of the Soviet regime and a 
Soviet social consciousness. Under the influence this restoration, soci-
ety is has been focusing on the past, not on the future of the country. 
The failure of de-sovietization has made it impossible to think about 
implementing a developmental strategy in Ukraine.  
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Europeanization might provide a wide range of measures for forming 
European democratic values in Ukrainian society, like the establish-
ment of a political culture and European cultural traditions. All the 
same, Ukraine itself will still have to manage the second round of 
transformations from authoritarianism to democracy, if it wants to re-
main an independent sovereign state and remain a fully-fledged 
Ukrainian nation. 
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